摘要
本文基于公共品可视性视角,考察了“官员晋升锦标赛”下晋升激励引发的地方政府公共投资的异质性竞争关系及其行为逻辑,使用空间非对称反应模型验证了地方政府对可视型和非可视型公共投资的差异化供给策略。研究发现:地方政府之间对可视型公共投资存在“逐顶竞争”,对非可视型公共投资存在“逐底竞争”;地方政府对不同可视型公共投资的差异化竞争及其策略差异源于“可视性偏差”衍生的有偏晋升激励,年龄构成官员晋升激励的关键因素。稳健性检验结果佐证了以上发现的可靠性。进一步分析发现,市委书记的差异化公共投资供给与竞争策略通过创造“可视型政绩”提高了晋升概率,但此结论对于市长不完全成立,这部分佐证了“一把手”效应的存在;改革干部政绩考核体系弱化了地方官员的公共投资结构扭曲,这折射出官员投资偏好随公共品“可视性”变化而变化的趋利逻辑。本文的启示是,中央政府可优化地方政府治理机制,完善公共基础设施的供应结构,助力经济高质量发展。
China's sustained and rapid economic growth cannot be achieved without the unremitting efforts of governments at all levels to implement public investment.From the perspective of government investment structure,all kinds of investments are mainly concentrated in high-speed rail,expressways,airports and other infrastructure fields,which eliminates the"bottleneck"of economic development and realizes the leapfrog development of transportation infrastructure.However,local governments'investment in underground pipe network and other urban infrastructure lags behind,resulting in urban waterlogging,road collapse,pipeline leakage and other public accidents frequently reported.Urban underground pipelines are an important"lifeline"to ensure urban operation.If local governments cannot fully supply these difficult to see infrastructure,the distortion of public investment structure caused by"visibility deviation"is likely to hinder high-quality economicdevelopment.Based on the perspective of public goods visibility,this paper examines the heterogeneous competitive relationship and behavior logic of local government public investment caused by the promotion incentive of"official promotion championship",and verifies the differentiated supply strategy of local government for visible and non-visible public investment by using the spatial asymmetric response model.The study found that there is"top by top competition"for visible public investment and""bottom by bottom competition"for non-visual public investment;the differentiated competition of local governments for different visible public investment and their strategy differences result from biased promotion incentive derived from"visual deviation",and age constitutes the key factor of official promotion incentive.The robustness test results support the reliability of the above findings.Further analysis shows that the differentiated public investment supply and competition strategy of the Party secretary improves the promotion probability by creating"visible achievements",which proves the existence of the"top"effect;the reform weakens the distortion of the public investment structure of local officials,which reflects the logic of officials'investment preference changing with the"visibility"of public goods.The marginal contribution of this paper lies in:first,introducing a new research perspective.From the perspective of"visibility"of public goods,it reveals the influence of the biased promotion incentive derived from"visibility bias"on the preference of local officials to supply different"visibility"of public goods and their dfferentiated competition strategies.Second,to expand the existing research content.This paper not only explores the influence of"visibility deviation"on the differentiation of local officials'public investment preference and their competitive strategy,but analyzes the changes of the reform of performance assessment system and public investment system;and it also uses the empirical model of the theme.The spatial asymmetric reaction model can identify the local government competition as"top competition"or"bottom competition",which overcomes the limitation of the traditional spatial measurement model to identify the spatial spillover effect.The implication of this article is that the central government can optimize the governance mechanism of local governments,improve the supply structure of public infrastructure,and promote high-quality economic development.First,to guide local officials to establish a correct view of achievements and development,reform and improve the cadre performance assessment system,supplemented by effective supervision mechanism,and restrain the distorted public investment behavior caused by biased promotion incentive derived from"visibility deviation".Second,the"top-down"performance assessment mechanism should achieve multiple governance goals compatible,pay attention to the differentiated response of local fficials to different weight indicators,and higher officials should pay equal attention to the visual and nonvisual public infrastructure such as city appearance and urban pipe network.Third,we will give full play to the effectiveness and restraint of the people's congresses over the governments at their corresponding levels,and ensure that government public investment aims at meeting the demands of people's livelihood and improving the quality of the economy.
作者
孙超
刘金东
SUN Chao;LIU Jin-dong(School of Economics,Shandong University,Shandong,Jinan,250100,China;Economic Research Center,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Shandong,Jinan,250014,China)
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第6期121-138,共18页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年项目“体制内就业偏好的形成、影响及干预研究”(19YJC790081)
山东省社会科学规划基金一般项目“数据赋能与经济社会发展活力问题研究”(20CSDJ28)。
关键词
晋升激励
官员异质性
公共投资竞争
可视性偏差
promotion incentive
official heterogeneous
public investment competition
visibility deviation
作者简介
孙超,男,博士研究生,研究领域是公共经济理论与公共政策,电子邮箱:sunch0804@mail.sdu.edu.cn;通讯作者:刘金东,男,副教授,硕士生导师,研究领域是财税改革、政府行为、企业涉房投资等,电子邮箱:liujindong@sdufe.edu.cn。
