摘要
当前,我国的反腐败斗争形势依然严峻复杂,需要构建联防联控的综合治理体系来扎紧织密制度的笼子。以内部控制和业绩考核两项制度为研究视角,利用2009年《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》的发布为外生冲击,采用双重差分法与分组检验程序,就二者构成的制度系统对高管隐性腐败是否能够发挥综合治理效应这一问题,分别从“互补性”与“效率性”两个维度进行检验。研究发现,两项制度对高管隐性腐败的防治具有双向补充效应,且不存在部分替代关系引发的效率性损失;进一步发现,业绩考核制度的变化带来了隐性腐败程度的降低,但内部控制在其中并没有表现出中介效应或遮盖效应,说明二项制度之间不存在程序上的互补替代关系;区分五要素发现,内部控制促进业绩考核制度防治隐性腐败的关键在于内部环境和内部监督,而不包括控制活动;最后,考虑制度环境的影响,发现综合治理在产权保护强与法律执行强的地区具有长期效果,而在产权保护弱与法律执行弱的地区不具有持续性。
At present,the situation of China’s anti-corruption struggle is still severe and complex.We need to build a comprehensive governance system of joint prevention and control to tighten and weave densely the cage of the system.From the perspective of internal control and performance evaluation,taking advantage of the exogenous impact of Interim Measures for the assessment of business performance of persons in charge of central enterprises issued in 2009 and using the difference in difference method and grouping test procedure,this paper examines whether the frame composed of internal control and performance evaluation system can play a comprehensive governance effect on the intangible corruption of senior executives from the two dimensions of“complementarity”and“efficiency”.It is found that the two systems have a two-way complement effect on the prevention of intangible corruption;Meanwhile,there is no efficiency loss caused by partial substitution relationship between them;It is further found that the change of performance appraisal system results in the reduction of the degree of intangible corruption,but internal control does not show intermediary effect or covering effect,indicating that there is no procedural complementary substitution relationship between them;By distinguishing five elements,it is found that the key of internal control promoting performance appraisal system and preventing intangible corruption lies in internal environment and internal supervision,rather than control activity;Finally,considering the impact of institutional environment,it is found that the comprehensive governance has a long-term effect in areas with strong property protection and law enforcement but does not sustain in areas with weak property protection and law enforcement.
作者
池国华
朱俊卿
王蕾
CHI Guohua;ZHU Junqing;WANG Lei(School of Government Audit,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,Jiangsu;School of Accounting,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,Jiangsu;School of Accounting,Xingtai University,Xingtai 054001,Hebei)
出处
《管理学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期122-143,共22页
Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71772089,72172061)。
关键词
隐性腐败
综合治理
内部控制
业绩考核
互补性
效率性
intangible corruption
comprehensive governance
internal control
performance evaluation
complementarity
efficiency
作者简介
池国华(1974—),男,福建龙岩人,博士,南京审计大学政府审计学院教授、博士生导师,研究方向:内部控制与业绩评价;通讯作者:朱俊卿(1982—),女,河北邢台人,博士,邢台学院会计学院讲师,研究方向:内部控制与公司治理;王蕾(1980—),女,辽宁葫芦岛人,博士,南京审计大学会计学院讲师,研究方向:内部控制与风险管理。
