摘要
传统上,员工持股计划被认为是加强员工激励的手段。本文以控股股东股权质押为研究场景,从新的视角揭示了控股股东推出员工持股计划的复杂动机。研究发现,在控股股东股权质押后,上市公司更有可能推出员工持股计划。由于在股权质押情境下推出的员工持股计划动机复杂,员工持股计划未能很好地实现预期的激励效果。因而,员工持股计划在一定程度上演变为在加强员工激励的“公共目标外衣”的掩护下,股权质押的控股股东用以提升股价、防范控制权转移风险的策略性手段。本文的讨论为监管当局和资本市场规范上市公司推出员工持股计划行为和控股股东股权质押行为提供新的思考方向和政策视角。
Traditionally, ESOP(Employee Stock Ownership Plan) is considered as a means to motivate employees. This paper is based on the research scenario of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge, and sheds new light on the controlling shareholders’ complex motives for launching ESOP. It is found that listed companies are more likely to launch ESOP after controlling shareholders’ equity pledge. Due to the complex motives for ESOP in the context of equity pledge, ESOP fails to achieve the expected incentive effect, and is reduced, to a certain extent, to a tactical means that the controlling shareholders with equity pledge use to raise the stock price and guard against the risk of control transfer under the cover of “public good” of incentivizing employees. The findings of this paper provide a new policy-making direction and perspective for regulatory authorities and capital markets to regulate the launch of ESOP and equity pledge of controlling shareholders.
作者
郑志刚
张浩
黄继承
赵锡军
ZHENG Zhigang;ZHANG Hao;HUANG Jicheng;ZHAO Xijun(Renmin University of China,100872)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第7期67-81,共15页
Finance & Trade Economics
作者简介
郑志刚,中国人民大学财政金融学院教授,中国人民大学中国财政金融政策研究中心研究员,100872;通讯作者:张浩,中国人民大学财政金融学院博士研究生,100872,电子邮箱:zhanghao_sf@rue.edu.cn;黄继承,中国人民大学财政金融学院副教授,100872;赵锡军,中国人民大学财政金融学院副院长、教授,中国人民大学中国资本市场研究院联席院长,100872。
