摘要
以错报为源头的财务重述严重损害了投资人的利益。通过区分财务错报和重述,本文探究分析师关注对两者的跨期监管作用。以2010-2016年沪深A股非金融企业为样本,一系列稳健性的结果发现:分析师关注有效降低了财务错报发生概率,表现为"事前震慑";且媒体报道加强了分析师关注的事前震慑作用。同时,分析师关注显著提升了财务重述概率,表现为"事后纠偏"。机制研究发现,分析师关注通过吸引投资人关注降低了财务错报。进一步研究表明外部分析师研报质量越高、内部管理者股价敏感度越高,分析师关注抑制错报的效应越显著。此外,分析师对重大财务错报的事前震慑作用更大,而对一般财务错报的事后纠偏作用更强。上述结果表明,分析师注意力吸聚能力和专业能力使其在企业信息披露质量方面既能"事前震慑"也能"事后纠偏"。
Financial restatement at the source of misstatement harms the interests of investors,and the objective of external supervision should be to reduce managers’speculative behavior of misreporting in advance and improve the behavior of financial restatement after misreporting occurs.However,a large number of previous literatures equate financial misreporting with financial restatement.So,based on the fraud triangle theory and agency theory,this paper explores the intertemporal regulatory role of analysts’attention by distinguishing between financial misreporting and restatement.Taking the A-share non-financial enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples from 2010 to 2016,a series of robust results show that:the attention of analysts effectively reduces the probability of financial misreporting,which is manifested as"Shock in advance".And media reports have reinforced analysts’attention about pre-emptive deterrence.At the same time,analysts’attention significantly increases the probability of financial restatement,which is manifested as"correction after the event".What’s more,we use the exogenous shock of brokerage merger to implement DID method for ensuring the robustness of the results.The mechanism study finds that the analyst attention reduces the financial misreporting by attracting investors’attention.Further research finds that the higher the quality of the external analyst reports,the higher the sensitivity of the manager to stock price,and the more significant the effect of the analyst reports on the inhibition of misreporting.In addition,analysts have a greater deterrent effect on major financial misreporting in advance,and a stronger corrective effect on general financial restatement later.The results suggest that analysts’ability to attract attention and expertise enables them to"shock in advance"and"correction after the event"on the quality of corporate disclosure.The contributions of this paper are as follows.On the one hand,we expand the research of the external governance role of analysts by studying the intertemporal supervision of financial misreporting and restatement.On the other hand,by distinguishing financial misreporting from restatement,this paper deepens the related research in the field of information disclosure quality.
作者
刘柏
琚涛
Liu Bai;Ju Tao(Business School,Jilin University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期50-61,96,73-75,共16页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(18BJY232)资助
关键词
财务错报
财务重述
分析师关注
跨期监管
Financial Misreporting
Financial Restatement
Analyst Attention
Intertemporal Regulation
作者简介
刘柏,吉林大学商学院教授、博士生导师、经济学博士,研究方向为公司治理与行为财务;琚涛,吉林大学商学院博士研究生,研究方向为公司治理
