摘要
随着矿工群体的改变,矿工心理因素是导致不安全行为重要隐蔽因素,而心理援助是解决矿工心理问题的重要途经,既有文献缺乏对心理援助和矿工不安全行为之间长期博弈过程的研究。根据心理援助过程中各参与主体的策略和收益,运用演化博弈理论和系统动力学对其进行建模和动态分析。研究结果表明:基于心理援助部门职能和矿工利益界定假设,心理援助部门和矿工存在6种不同情况的演化博弈行为,稳定均衡点与心理援助成本、不援助受到的处罚、以及矿工不同策略下的成本和收益有密切关系。
With the change of miners′group,the psychological factors of miners are important hidden factors leading to unsafe behaviors,and psychological assistance is an important way to solve the psychological problems of miners.The existing literature lacks research on the long-term game process between psychological assistance and unsafe behaviors of miners.According to the strategies and benefits of each participant in the process of psychological assistance,the evolutionary game theory and system dynamics are used to model and analyze it dynamically.The results show that,based on the hypothesis that psychological assistance department functions and miners′interests are defined,there are six kinds of evolutionary game behaviors between psychological assistance department and miners in different situations,and the stability equilibrium point is closely related to psychological assistance costs,penalties for non-assistance,and costs and benefits of miners under different strategies.
作者
冯念青
杨舒婷
FENG Nian-qing;YANG Shu-ting(School of Architectural Engineering,Anyang University,Anyang 455000,China)
出处
《煤炭技术》
CAS
北大核心
2021年第7期210-212,共3页
Coal Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573086)。
关键词
心理援助
不安全行为
演化博弈
系统动力学
psychological assistance
unsafe behavior
evolutionary game
system dynamics
作者简介
冯念青(1994-),女,河南安阳人,硕士研究生,研究方向:矿工安全行为,电子信箱:2942025103@qq.com;通信作者:杨舒婷,电子信箱:823374758@qq.com.
