摘要
针对矿工情绪可能导致不安全行为的问题,以进化博弈论为基础,构建了"矿工情绪监管-矿工不安全行为"的博弈模型,对模型的求解和分析结果表明,情绪对矿工不安全行为的潜在风险值、矿工情绪监管者对矿工情绪疏导的成本、矿工的安全作业成本分别与矿工不安全行为呈正向关系,矿工因情绪导致不安全行为的成本、发生安全事故后矿工所需承担的损失值分别与矿工不安全行为成负向关系。提出了通过人为干预的方式来提高煤矿对矿工情绪监管的效率和减少矿工因情绪导致不安全行为的对策。
For the problem that Miner＇s mood may lead to unsafe behavior, a game model of＂miner emotion supervision and miner＇s unsafe behavior＂was constructed based on the theory of evolutionary game theory. The solution and analysis results of the model showed that the potential risk value of emotion to the unsafe behaviors of miners, the cost of emotional adjustment for miners from supervisor and the cost of safe operation of miners are positively correlated with the unsafe behaviors of miners; the cost of unsafe behaviors caused by miners＇ emotion and the loss value that they should bear after safety accidents are negatively correlated with the unsafe behaviors of miners. This paper proposes some measures to improve the efficiency of coal mine emotional regulation and reduce the unsafe behaviors of coal mine by means of human intervention.
作者
杨雪
田阳
仝凤鸣
YANG Xue;TIAN Yang;TONG Fengming(North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou 450046,China)
出处
《煤矿安全》
CAS
北大核心
2018年第8期299-302,共4页
Safety in Coal Mines
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573086)
河南省高等学校哲学社会科学创新团队支持计划资助项目(2014-CXTD-10)
关键词
矿工
情绪
情绪监管
进化博弈
不安全行为
安全管理
miner
emotion
emotional supervision
evolutionary game
unsafe behavior
safety management
作者简介
杨雪（1966-），女，河南光山人，河南省特聘教授，博士生导师，主要从事管理科学与工程、安全科学等相关研究。
