摘要
随着金融市场的快速发展,我国企业金融化趋势不断加深,引起了学术界对经济“脱实向虚”问题的关注。本文以我国2008〜2016年A股上市公司作为样本研究了企业金融化对审计师选择的影响及其作用机理。研究发现金融化水平较高的企业,更可能选择较低质量的审计师。进一步分析发现,这一关系在内部控制质量较低或行业竞争度较低的公司中更加显著。区分金融资产期限后发现,长期金融资产投资水平越高,企业越倾向于选择低质量审计师。最后发现,公司投资金融资产会增加管理层与股东之间的代理冲突,进而促进企业选择低质量审计师。本研究丰富了企业金融化和审计师选择决策的文献,为公司更好地认识企业金融化,促进虚拟经济与实体经济共同发展提供了经验证据。
With the rapid development of the financial markets,the trend of enterprise financialization continues to grow,which attracts attention from the academia to the problem of diversion from real to virtual economy.This paper uses the A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2016 as our sample to study the relationship between corporate financialization and auditor choice・The results show that the higher companies financialization is,the more likely they are to choose low-quality auditor.In further analysis,we find that the relationship between corporate financialization and auditor choice is more pronounced in firms with weaker internal control,and firms with lower market competition.After distinguishing the financial assets types,we find that enterprises investing in more long-term financial assets are more inclined to choose low-quality auditors.In addition,agency conflicts may be the channel through which corporate financialization affects auditor choices.This paper enriches the literature on corporate financialization and auditor choice,provides empirical evidence for companies to better understand corporate financialization and promotes the joint development of financialization and real economy.
作者
李百兴
赵庆庆
李瑞敬
Li Baixing;Zhao Qingqing;Li Ruijing
出处
《审计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期67-76,共10页
Auditing Research
基金
国家社科基金项目“基于价值链理论的企业质量成本管理与分担机制研究”(项目批准号:18BGL077)资助。
作者简介
李百兴,首都经济贸易大学会计学院,邮政编码:100070,电子信箱:lbx@cueb.edu.cn;赵庆庆,首都经济贸易大学会计学院,邮政编码:100070,电子信箱:lbx@cueb.edu.cn;李瑞敬,首都经济贸易大学会计学院,邮政编码:100070,电子信箱:lbx@cueb.edu.cn。
