摘要
本文考察战略差异度是否影响企业聘请高质量外部审计师的概率。研究发现:(1)战略差异度与高质量审计师的聘用显著正相关;(2)在代理冲突严重的公司中,战略差异度对高质量审计师聘用的影响更加显著;(3)经营风险和管理者自由裁量权所导致的代理冲突在战略差异度和高质量审计师聘用之间发挥着中介作用;(4)高质量审计师可以显著抑制战略差异度较大公司的盈余管理和大股东掏空行为,并降低其权益资本成本。本研究丰富了战略差异的经济后果以及审计师选择影响因素的相关文献,进一步加深我们对战略如何影响企业决策的理解。
Using data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies spanning years 2003-2018,we examine whether a firm’s business strategy that deviates from industry conventions influences corporate governance mechanisms,particularly the probability of choosing high-quality external auditors.We document a significantly positive correlation between a firm’s strategic deviance and high-quality auditor engagement.The exacerbation of agency conflict is an important driver for firms with strategic deviance to hire high-quality auditors.Moreover,we find evidence that hiring high quality auditors can curb earnings management and capital occupation of major shareholders in firms with deviant strategies,and reduce the cost of equity capital for these firms.We conclude that strategically deviant firms hire high-quality auditors due to agency conflicts.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期144-158,共15页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71902181)
河南省软科学研究计划项目(202400410388)
河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究计划项目(2019-ZZJH-049)资助
关键词
战略差异
审计师选择
代理成本
合法性
高质量审计师
Strategic Deviance
Auditor Selection
Agency Costs
Legitimacy
High-quality Auditor
作者简介
通讯作者:高靖宇,gaojingyu@cueb.edu.cn。
