疫情期扶持中小微企业发展与保障就业研究被引量：9

Research on Supporting the Development of SMEs and Ensuring Employment During the Epidemic Period

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摘要当前,中国的新冠肺炎疫情已基本得到控制,但疫情的发生令中小微企业生产销售受阻、成本上升、陷入经营困境、减少用工需求,进而对劳动力市场产生影响,大量劳动者失业,同时求职难度加剧。在此背景下,本文依据演化博弈理论和企业激励以及个体激励相关理论,建立了中小微企业决策和劳动者求职决策的演化博弈模型,演绎了促进就业相关措施实施前以及促就业相关措施实施后两种情况下中小微企业雇佣决策和劳动者求职的策略选择过程,通过演化博弈分析,明晰了中小微企业和劳动者不同决策选择受相关政策实施影响的激励机制。研究表明,我国稳就业、保就业的相关政策措施能够令中小微企业尽快恢复生产,摆脱经营困境,向社会供给更多工作岗位;也能够提升求职主体寻找工作岗位的激励,降低求职难度,推动稳就业、保就业政策目标的实现,最终达到中小微企业良好发展同时就业得到保障的“双赢”局面。 At present,the epidemic in China has been basically controlled,but the occurrence of the epidemic has hindered the production and sales of SMEs,increased costs,trapped in operational difficulties,reduced labor demand,and thus has an impact on the labor market.A large number of workers are unemployed,while the difficulty of finding a job is increasing.Based on this background,this paper establishes the evolutionary game model of the decision-making of SMEs and job seekers according to the theory of evolutionary game,enterprise incentive and individual incentive,and deduces the process of the decision-making of the employment of SMEs and job seekers before and after the implementation of the relevant measures of promoting employment.Through evolutionary game analysis,the incentive mechanism of different decision-making choices of SMEs and workers affected by the implementation of relevant policies is clarified.The research shows that,on the one hand,the relevant policies and measures to stabilize employment in China can enable SMEs to resume production as soon as possible,get rid of business difficulties,and provide more jobs to the society,on the other hand,they can also improve the incentive of job seekers to find jobs,reduce the difficulty of job-hunting,and promote the realization of the policy objectives of stabilizing employment and ensuring employment.Finally,we can achieve a win-win situation in which SMEs develop well and employment is guaranteed.

作者孟繁锦王玉霞王琦 Meng Fanjin;Wang Yuxia;Wang Qi(School of Economics,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)

机构地区东北财经大学经济学院

出处《工业技术经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第10期15-20,共6页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

关键词就业新冠肺炎疫情中小微企业演化博弈仿真分析激励机制 employment coronavirus epidemic SMEs evolutionary game simulation analysis incentive mechanism

分类号 F276.3 [经济管理—企业管理] F241.4 [经济管理—劳动经济]

作者简介孟繁锦,东北财经大学经济学院博士研究生,研究方向:产业经济学;王玉霞,东北财经大学经济学院教授,博士,博士生导师,研究方向:产权与合约;王琦,东北财经大学经济学院博士研究生,研究方向:公司治理。