产品服务供应链中产品与延保服务的联合定价与协调被引量：15

Pricing and Coordination Strategy of Product and Extended Warranty in Product Service Supply Chain

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摘要针对不同故障率预期的顾客对延保服务的选择性购买问题,在构建顾客效用函数的基础上建立了制造商提供延保服务、零售商销售产品及延保服务的两级产品服务供应链利润模型,设计了固定支付+延保服务收益共享契约使制造商提高延保服务水平的同时,弥补服务成本上升造成的利润损失。研究表明,该契约可以有效降低延保服务价格,实现供应链协调。最后,通过数值算例对比分析了服务水平对供应链系统利润以及固定转移支付对协调前后供应链企业利润的影响。 Focusing on the purchase choices of customers on extended warranty when their expectations on failure rate are different,a theoretical analysis model of a two level product service supply chain model is developed.Based on customer utility,the decision equilibriums of the supply chain is analyzed when the manufacturer provides the extended warranty while the retailer sells the product and the extended warranty simultaneously.A fixed-payment-and-profit-sharing contract is designed to help the manufacturer improve the service and compensate for the profit loss caused by the increase in service cost.The conclusions show that the contract can decrease the price of extended warranty service,improve service,and increase the profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer,thus coordinating the supply chain.The numerical analyses reveal the effect of service and fixed payment on the profits of the system and its members.

作者寇军张旭梅周茂森但斌 KOU Jun;ZHANG Xumei;ZHOU Maosen;DAN Bin(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing Univesity,Chongqing 400044,China;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics at Chongqing University,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China)

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室

出处《系统管理学报》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2020年第3期601-607,共7页 Journal of Systems & Management

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572020) 国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2015BAF05B01)。

关键词产品服务供应链延保服务定价收益共享协调策略 product service supply chain extended warranty pricing profits sharing coordination strategy

分类号 F274 [经济管理—企业管理]

作者简介寇军(1984-),男,博士生。研究方向为供应链管理与制造业服务化;通信作者:张旭梅(1966-),女,教授,博士生导师。E-mail:zhangxumei@cqu.edu.cn。

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