摘要
在中国式分权背景下,分析财政分权和地方政府竞争对地方政府债务规模的影响,并利用中国西部D省的县级面板数据进行实证分析。研究表明:地方政府债务的产生源于分权体制下财权和事权不匹配,以及分权激励下的地方政府竞争。但二者对地方政府债务的影响存在差异:对欠发达地区的县级政府而言,分权体制下的财政支出压力是驱动地方政府举债的重要因素。财政支出分权程度越高,地方承担的支出责任越大,地方政府债务规模越大。在财政收入有限性和支出刚性的综合约束下,地方政府竞争对地方政府债务规模的影响相对较小。
This paper analyzes the effect of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental competition on local government debts and estimates a panel model by utilizing Chinese county- level panel data. The results show that local government debt expansion is caused not only by the imbalance betw een expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization,but also by intergovernmental competition from Chinese decentralization. How ever,these tw o factors have different impacts on local government debts. As to local government in less developed area,the fiscal expenditure pressure from the fiscal decentralization is a very important factor. The greater the degree of fiscal expenditure decentralization is,the higher the pressure of fiscal expenditure is and the larger the scale of local government debt is. The effect of intergovernmental competition on local government debt expansion is relatively small under the constraints of the limited fiscal revenue and the rigid expenditure.
出处
《财贸研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第3期97-103,共7页
Finance and Trade Research
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"公共财政安全监测预警机制研究"(12JZD031)
关键词
财政分权
政府竞争
地方政府债务
fiscal decentralization
intergovernmental competition
local government debts
