摘要
人类基因有伦理性和社会性,对于不涉及人类创造性活动的原生基因发现不应授予专利权。对于发现权与发明权的区分,并非只要存在人类劳动就认可其发明专利性质,还应当考虑人类创造性劳动的参与程度。专利权扩张易引发社会负效应,必须考虑其社会效应和权益平衡问题。从知识产权的性质和目的而论,单纯的科学发现不应给予专利权保护,但应考虑在传统专利垄断权以外给予科学发现权利人其他形式的补偿,以达到社会福利和个人利益的相互协调。
The human gene has its particularity.It can not be judged by the standard of the general patentable object.It also needs to be evaluated in combination with the social effect.The distinction between the right to discovery and the right to invention is not to recognize the nature of the invention patent as long as there is human labor,and the degree of participation of human labor should be considered.The scientific discovery should not give the protection of the patent right, but should consider other forms of compensation for the scientific discovery of the right holder outside the monopoly of the traditional patent.
出处
《行政与法》
2018年第10期108-117,共10页
Administration and Law
关键词
人类基因
基因技术
发现权
发明权
不可专利性
gene technology
right of discovery
right of invention
non-patentability
作者简介
葛森（1983-），男，安徽合肥人，复旦大学法学院博士研究生，研究方向为经济法学、国际法学。
