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标的价值异估计条件下兼并交易价格确定的博弈分析

The Game Analysis to Price the Target Enterprise with Different Estimated Distribution Functions of Bilateral Enterprises of M&A
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摘要 尽管Rubinstein讨价还价定理给出了交易标的估值相同情形下的价格确定方法,但是对交易双方标的价值估计不相同情形下价格确定却显得无能为力。在已有研究基础上,提出了交易双方标的价值异估计情形下Rubinstein讨价还价定理的改进,给出了标的价值异估计假设下分布区间相同和不同两种情形下交易价格确定思路。在此分析基础上,给出了常见均匀分布、正态分布以及几何布朗分布等情形下的价格确定的解析表达式,运用数值仿真技术说明了研究结论的现实解释力。最后,通过我国A股资产兼并交易价格确定的实证分析进一步说明了研究结论的现实解释力。 The essential of pricing the target enterprise is an actual bargaining process with estimating distribution functions of target enterprise between two sides of Mergers and Acquisitions(MA).Although the idea of determining the transaction price is given by the famous Rubinstein bargaining theorem,which is established on the same estimated distribution function of transaction target between two bargaining sides,the confliction may exist when the theorem is applied in the reality with different distribution functions.Thus,we modified the Rubinstein theorem to be suitable for the above mentioned phenomena in order to solve the price decision problem with the same interval or the different intervals.In addition,some widely used distributions such as the uniform distribution,standard normal distribution and geometry Brownian motion are discussed in details to illustrate the price making process.In the last,an empirical study on the MA of China A-share firms is analyzed to illustrate the explaining power of our study in practice.
作者 俞静 徐斌 YU J ing XU Bin(School of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance & Economics, Beijing 100081, China)
出处 《系统管理学报》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2017年第5期869-878,共10页 Journal of Systems & Management
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71171207)
关键词 Rubinstein讨价还价定理 标的价值异估计 博弈分析 兼并交易 价格确定 Rubinstein bargain theorem different estimated distribution of target value game analyses the transaction of M&A price decision
作者简介 俞静(1969-),女,副教授。研究方向为财务决策与分析、资产市场审计。 通信作者:徐斌(1966-),男,教授,博士生导师。E—mail:zhuohongxubin@163.com
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