摘要
本文针对我国企业并购中交易方式单一的现存问题 ,设计了企业并购的拍卖机制 ,并对该机制下并购交易双方的报价行为进行了研究 ,得出了均衡状态下各局中人的最优策略 ,从而对企业并购交易价格的确定有所启示。
In this paper,aiming at the existing problem that there are few selected merging methods in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in China,auctions mechanism is put fo rward.Moreover,bids behaviors of both sides in an auction are studied,and those players optimal bid strategy in equilibrium is derived.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2003年第2期28-31,共4页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
