摘要
本文以我国上市公司为研究对象,结合我国特殊的制度背景,从投资效率角度研究机构投资者对大股东控制权私利的治理效应,以及机构投资者与大股东控制在公司治理方面的交互作用。结果发现,大股东持股比例与非效率投资呈正相关,但在两类不同产权公司中存在差异;机构持股变化在两类公司中均与非效率投资呈显著负相关,但其程度在非国有公司更为显著。这一结果表明机构投资者能有效抑制大股东的非效率投资行为,但其在国有公司中的治理效应受到限制。文章的研究结论对进一步推进国有企业产权制度改革,提升企业投资效率及决策质量具有极其重要的价值,同时也为我国大力发展机构投资者的相关决策提供依据。
Focusing on the listed companies of China, and combining with China＇s distinctive system background, this paper, on the basis of controlling the endogenous issue of institutional investors, studies the role of corporate governance of institutional investors to private benefits of control （PBC） of large shareholders from the perspective of investment efficiency, and their interactive effect. We find that holding proportions of the large shareholders are positively correlated with inefficient investment, with the difference between in state-owned companies and in non-state-owned ones. There is a significant negative correlation between shareholding fluctuation of the institutional investors and inefficient investment, which is more significant in non-state-owned finns. It shows that the institutional investors can effectively restrain inefficient investment, but state-owned controlling will restrict their governance effect. The conclusion has important implications to further advance the property fight system reform of state-owned enterprises, and to enhance investment efficiency and provides evidence for the decisions of developing institutional investors in China.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期35-42,共8页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:70472068)
教育部人文社科规划项目(项目编号:09YJA630002)
关键词
大股东控制
机构投资者
治理效应
投资效率
large shareholder control, institutional investors, governance effect, investment efficiency
作者简介
叶松勤，中国人民大学会计学博士生，安徽财经大学讲师，研究方向：公司治理、会计理论与方法。
徐经长，中国人民大学商学院教授、博士生导师，研究方向：证券市场会计监管、国际会计比较与协调。
