摘要
论文以2006-2010年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,研究了管理层盈余预告消息性质、盈余预告披露精确性对分析师预测行为的影响。研究结果表明,相对于坏消息,管理层对好消息的预告会得到均衡透明的披露,因此分析师跟踪人数更多,预测更为准确,分歧度更小。另外还发现盈余预告精确性的提高对分析师跟踪人数并无显著影响,但是随着管理层盈余预告精确性的提高,分析师的预测误差和分歧度均有所减小。
By using data of listed companies of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2006 to 2010 as a sample, this paper examines the effect of the nature of management forecast news, management forecast precision to analyst forecast behavior. Empirical results show that compared with the bad news, management earnings forecast of good news will have a balanced and transparent disclosure, so management earnings forecast of good news will have a larger analyst following, more accurate analyst forecast and less dispersion. We also find that no significant effect on management forecast precision of analyst following, but with the improvement of precision, the analyst forecast error and dispersion are reduced.
出处
《财务与金融》
2013年第1期35-40,共6页
Accounting and Finance
关键词
盈余预告消息性质
精确性
分析师预测
Nature of Management Earnings Forecast News
Precision
Analyst＇s Forecast
作者简介
高巍婷，石河子大学经济与管理学院研究生，研究方向：财务理论；新疆石河子，832000
