管理层盈余预告消息性质与预告方式操控性选择被引量：14

The Kinds of Management Earnings Forecast News and the Discretionary Choice of Characteristic of Forecast Disclosure

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摘要文章利用我国A股上市公司2004年1季度-2007年4季度管理层盈余预告样本数据,检验了盈余预告消息性质对管理层盈余预告披露精确性、及时性及态度倾向选择的影响。检验的结果表明:管理层对消息性质为好消息的盈余预告比对坏消息的选择了更为精确的预告方式;而对坏消息的盈余预告态度倾向于欠悲观或相对乐观。实证结果说明,管理层在对不同性质消息的盈余预告过程中存在一定程度的操控性披露选择。 Using the data of the A-stock-market listed companies in China from 1st quarter of 2004 to the 4th quarter of 2007, this paper conducts the test of the effect of corporate litigation risk on the selection of management earnings forecast accuracy, timeliness and attitude. We find that： the management chooses more precise forecast characteristic for the kind of good news earnings forecast than for bad news earnings forecast; but the attitude toward bad news earnings forecast tends to be less pessimistic or relatively optimistic. Our finding shows that the managements have discretionary disclosure in earnings forecast of different kinds of earnings forecast news.

作者高敬忠周晓苏

机构地区南开大学商学院

出处《商业经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第11期89-96,共8页 Journal of Business Economics

基金国家自然科学基金项目资助(70872053) 天津市会计学会重点科研项目资助(kjkyxm090401)

关键词盈余预告消息性质精确性及时性态度倾向操控性披露 kind of management earnings forecast news precision timeliness bias of management attitude discretionary disclosure

分类号 F234.4 [经济管理—会计学]

作者简介高敬忠（1975-），男，江苏泰州人，南开大学商学院博士研究生，主要从事财务分析研究；周晓苏（1954-），女，四川资中人，南开大学商学院教授，博士生导师，主要从事财务分析、会计信息质量研究。

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参考文献11

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