审计风险、审计定价与相对谈判能力——以受监管部门处罚或调查的公司为例被引量：82

Audit Risk,Audit Pricing and Relative Bargaining Power——Evidence from Listed Companies that are Investigated or Punished by Supervisors

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摘要本文以受到相关监管部门调查或处罚(这类公司简称为违规公司,下同)作为衡量审计风险的替代变量,讨论了审计风险对审计定价的影响。研究结果表明,违规公司披露接受调查或处罚信息当年的审计费用显著高于其他公司,而在相关信息披露前一年,这种差异却并不显著。进一步的研究结果表明,虽然审计师能够在前一年认识到违规公司的异常审计风险,但是在审计市场竞争压力下,能否提高审计定价却在很大程度上取决于审计师的相对谈判能力。本文的研究结果表明,在审计风险水平一定的情况下,审计师的相对谈判能力越强,审计定价就越高。 This paper discusses auditors' reaction to audit risk by examining the audit fees of listed companies that are investigated or punished by supervisors.The result shows that audit fees are significantly higher when companies disclosed the fact that they are investigated or punished,but the difference is not significant in the year before it is disclosed.Further evidences show that auditors can discover the higher audit risk in the previous year,but whether they can raise audit fee depend on their relative bargaining power.The result indicates that audit fee is positively related to auditors' relative bargaining power under certain supervising risk.

作者宋衍蘅

机构地区浙江大学管理学院

出处《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第2期79-84,97,共6页 Accounting Research

基金国家自然基金项目(71072116)的资助

关键词审计风险审计定价相对谈判能力

分类号 F239.4 [经济管理—会计学]

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参考文献11

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