校企合作研发的最优制度安排被引量：31

The Optimal Institutional Arrangement for University——Industry Collaborative Research

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摘要本文在对校企合作研发的相关概念进行界定的基础上,讨论了校企合作研发的基本模式及其制度特征的经济学含义,并重点分析了校企共同研发的最优制度安排问题。本研究的主要结论是,在知识产权保护有效的情况下,企业与大学共同研发的最优合约安排是由企业拥有技术创新成果的知识产权,同时企业向大学提供一个固定支付加上与技术绩效挂钩的可变报酬(类似于版税);在弱知识产权保护的情况下,一种次优的可能安排是大学和企业模拟企业间合作研发时采用的合资企业的组织形式,但大学拥有收益权、而不具表决权的干股。本研究的政策含义是,在共同研究过程中,为有效地促进公共研究机构的科技成果转化,企业对知识产权的争取必须配合其他的支付机制,如与研发产出挂钩的可变支付,以尽可能地激励大学的研发努力。 Based on the clarification of the concepts of university-industry collaborative research（UICR）,this paper studies the basic models of UICR and their institutional features,and focuses on the optimal institutional arrangement for research joint venture（RJV）.The two main findings are：Firstly,in the setting of effective protection for intellectual property（IP）,the optimal contract for RJV is offering the firm the IP of technological innovations,and the firm pays the university a fix payment and a variable recompense which is linked to technological performance（an analogy to royalties）.Secondly,if the IP right is weekly protected,the second-best arrangement is establishing a joint venture enterprise,but university should be entitled the residual claim right without voting right.This paper suggests that during collaborative research,the firm＇s claim to IP must be complemented with other supportive payment mechanisms,such as a variable payment that linked to RD outcome,which is able to maximize the university＇s RD efforts.

作者贺俊黄阳华沈云昌

机构地区中国社会科学院工业经济研究所

出处《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第2期151-160,共10页 China Industrial Economics

基金国家社会科学基金重大项目"构建区域创新系统战略研究"(批准号08&ZD038) 中国社会科学院重大项目"中国企业自主创新激励政策研究"

关键词校企合作研发共同研发激励合约 university-industry collaborative research research joint venture incentive contract

分类号 F276.42 [经济管理—企业管理]

作者简介【作者简介】贺俊（1976-），男，山西太原人，中国社会科学院工业经济研究所助理研究员，博士；黄阳华（1984-），男，江西临川人，中国社会科学院工业经济研究所助理研究员，博士；沈云昌（1976-），男，云南楚雄人．中国社会科学院工业经济研究所博士研究生。

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