摘要
以往研究鲜有基于税务行政处罚裁量基准视角考察税收征管规范化对企业财务报告质量的影响,而各地方税务行政处罚裁量基准实践为探究税收征管规范化与企业财务报告质量关系搭建了可行的“准自然实验”环境。研究发现,相比于各地方税务行政处罚裁量基准实施前,在各地方税务行政处罚裁量基准实施后,税收征管规范化显著改善了企业财务报告质量;而且,这种关系尤其体现在避税程度较高和征纳合谋程度较高的公司中。由此表明,伴随着税务行政处罚裁量基准实施,税收征管规范化显著改善了企业财务报告质量。因此,税收征管体制规范化能够优化上市公司外部治理环境,对资本市场信息披露环境改善具有重要实践意义。
Previous studies of tax enforcement neglect the effect of tax-penalty discretionary benchmarks on corporate financial reporting quality.In China,province-level variations in implementing tax-penalty discretionary benchmarks provide a quasi-natural experiment to explore how tax enforcement standardization affects corporate financial reporting quality.We show that when tax-penalty benchmarks are implemented in every province,there is a more pronounced positive relationship between tax enforcement standardization and corporate financial reporting quality compared with the ex-ante period.Moreover,this positive relationship is primarily driven by firms with higher degrees of tax avoidance and collusion with tax collectors.Consequently,the implementation of tax-penalty benchmarks means that the standardization of tax enforcement can improve corporate financial reporting quality.In turn,tax enforcement standardization can optimize the external governance environment for listed firms and improve financial information disclosure in capital markets.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第2期3-11,共9页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72202099)
中国博士后科学(2021M700022)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(KYQN2023011)
江苏省社科应用研究精品工程财经发展专项课题(22SCB-33)的资助
关键词
税务行政处罚裁量基准
税收征管
规范化
企业财务报告质量
准自然实验
Tax-penalty Discretionary Benchmarks
Tax Enforcement
Standardization
Financial Reporting Quality
Quasi-natural Experiment
