摘要
基于契约参照理论,本文以我国2010—2019年A股上市公司为样本,研究高管薪酬"以史为锚"的历史参照效应对超额在职消费的影响。结果表明,当高管薪酬相较历史薪酬比值越低时,其超额在职消费程度越高,并且上述结论在采用工具变量、倾向得分匹配以及熵平衡法控制内生性问题后依然显著成立。进一步研究表明,上述影响主要发生在公司内外部治理水平较低的企业(媒体关注度较低、内部控制质量较差的企业)。从高管个体认知偏差的角度,为企业制定激励政策提供了新的思路和借鉴依据,为监管层抑制高管超额在职消费提供了理论支撑和经验证据。
Based on the contract reference point theory,this study uses the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2019 to test the influence of the historical reference effect of executive compensation“anchored by history”on excess perks.The results show that the lower the ratio of executive compensation to historical compensation is,the higher the degree of excess perks is.Moreover,the above conclusions are still remarkably valid after controlling endogeneity problems with instrumental variables,propensity score matching and entropy balance.Further research shows that the above effects mainly occur in enterprises with low levels of internal and external governance(enterprises with low media attention and poor internal control quality).From the perspective of executives.individual cognitive bias,this paper provides new ideas and reference basis for enterprises to formulate incentive policies,and provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for regulators to curb excess perks.
作者
黄诗华
陈艳
陈邑早
Shihua Huang;Yan Chen;Yizao Chen
出处
《会计与控制评论》
2021年第1期233-251,共19页
Review of Accounting and Control
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL055)
教育部人文社科基金项目(20YJA630007)
关键词
薪酬激励
历史契约参照
超额在职消费
公司治理
Compensation Incentive
Historical Contract Reference
Excess Perk
Corporate Governance
作者简介
黄诗华(1994-),女,辽宁营口人,东北财经大学会计学院博士研究生,研究方向:公司治理与会计舞弊;通讯作者:陈艳(1961-),女,江苏涟水人,东北财经大学会计学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:会计舞弊与风险管理;陈邑早(1994-),男,山东威海人,东北财经大学会计学院博士研究生,研究方向:行为会计与内部控制。
