摘要
代理成本理论无法全面解释公司机会原则的制度功能,更无法为界定公司机会提供方法论上的指引。作为企业理论的另一分支,交易费用理论能够揭示公司机会原则的"隐藏"功能。公司机会原则决定一项生产活动是由市场契约处理还是企业内部化,进而影响企业的边界。法律真正需要保护的是与企业专用性资产相匹配的商业机会。在规则设计上,宜将公司的实际营业范围与付出的实质性努力作为界定公司机会的重要依据,同时谨慎对待公司"无能力"抗辩。考虑到我国《公司法》并不允许相关方在事前"选出"忠实义务,因此将"利用职务便利"作为认定"篡夺公司机会"的必备要素是合理的。唯有将公司法规则置于企业理论的大框架下,方能全面理解其背后的经济理性。
The agency cost theory cannot fully explain the economic rational of the corporate opportunity rule and line of corporate opportunity as well.As a branch of the theory of firm,transaction cost theory can help explain the hidden economic rational of this rule.The rule affects the decision on whether a given activity can be kept within those boundaries or not,which in turn influences boundaries of firms.The business line test is an important factor,however impossible argument should not be accepted.Considering the duty of loyalty cannot be waived under Chinese Company Law,the rule that distinguish between opportunities that are discovered in or outside an insider’s capacity as a director may well be efficient.Reconsidering the corporate opportunity rule from a wider perspective allows us fully to understand the economic rational.
出处
《贸大法律评论》
2019年第1期69-80,共12页
Uibe Legal Science
关键词
公司机会原则
代理成本
交易费用
资产专用性
corporate opportunity theory of firm
agency costs
transaction cost
firm-specific investment
作者简介
蔡卓瞳,华东政法大学国际金融法律学院硕士研究生。
