摘要
突发公共事件给企业经营带来了冲击,外界出于“同情”的考虑降低了对企业的盈利预期,松动了监管环境,并予以各种经济救助,大量释放同情红利。本文基于舞弊三角理论厘清了管理层盈余管理的心理决策路径,从同情红利的视角检验了突发公共事件对上市公司负向盈余管理行为产生的影响。研究发现:(1)突发公共事件冲击下上市公司倾向于从事负向盈余管理活动,公司所在行业受冲击越大,从事负向盈余管理的可能性越大。(2)突发公共事件冲击引发了同情的外部环境,投资者分心、监管放松等因素促使了上市公司负向盈余管理行为的发生。(3)负向盈余管理有助于上市公司在受到冲击后获得更多融资和税收方面的同情红利,并且受冲击大的行业较冲击小的行业获得了更多的同情红利。(4)这些基于红利攫取的负向盈余管理行为将损害公司的未来价值。本文旨在为突发公共事件冲击下的上市公司盈余管理动机及影响研究提供经验和参考,为监管上市公司盈余管理行为、扶持经济主体发展提供政策建议。
The Public Emergencies outbreak at the end of 2019 has caused operational issues for many firms.The consideration of“sympathy”from the outside world will not only lower the expectation of corporate profits and easing the regulatory environment,but also give corresponding policies to help enterprises in times of“blood transfusion”need.However,this sympathy is always extended to enterprises in special distress in the abnormal economy.Hence,as a result of this“abnormal”economic impact,enterprises are likely to systematically change the disclosure of earnings data to win“sympathy”support,and“poor-mouth”negative earnings management emerges as the times require.The act of“poor-mouth”is a strategic behavior that arouses the emotional identity of others or achieves the predetermined goal by means of self-deprecation,in order to elicit the sympathy of the targeted audience and its organization,so as to obtain the shield of vested interests and the care of expected interests.“Poor-mouth”earnings management refers to the financial information that enterprises show their current operating difficulties in an effort to gain social sympathy and policy support and other benefits,such as financing support,government subsidies and tax incentives.However,if firms do not hesitate to resort to fraud and“poor-mouth”and take opportunistic actions,it will crowd out the relief resources of the truly trapped enterprises,distort the allocation of the government’s sympathy resources,and is not conducive to the enterprise’s own value promotion and sustainable development.Based on the fraud triangle theory,this paper clarifies the management’s psychological decision-making path for negative earnings management under the epidemic.Using the earnings management data of Chinese A-share listed companies from the fourth quarter of 2018 to the third quarter of 2020,this paper tests the impact of the major public emergency on the negative earnings management practices of enterprises from the perspective of sympathy bonus.The study discovered that firms tend to engage in negative earnings management under the impact of the epidemic.The greater the impact of the epidemic on the industry,the greater the possibility of engaging in negative earnings management.The external environment,such as investor distraction and deregulation brought about by the epidemic,has promoted the occurrence of negative earnings management.In terms of financing and taxation following the outbreak,negative earnings management aided enterprises in obtaining greater sympathy bonus.More sympathy bonuses were attained in the significantly afflicted industries than in the less affected industries.However,these poor bonus-capture-based earnings management practices damage the market value in the long run.The contributions of this paper are as follows.This paper first offers a different explanation for how enterprises engage in negative earnings management practices:rent-seeking behavior that is actively pursued in order to receive sympathy bonus,also known as“poor-mouth”earnings management.It enriches the research on the motivation of earnings management from the perspective of policy bonus pursuit,and reveals the behavior of listed firms when they engage in negative earnings management from the perspective of government subsidies,tax evasion and financing costs.Secondly,through the test of economic consequences,this paper discusses whether negative earnings management deviates from the original intention of government economic assistance and distorts the efficiency of resource allocation of sympathy bonus among firms,so as to examine the efficiency of government economic assistance in the abnormal economy.Finally,this paper incorporates the fraud triangle theory into the enterprise decision-making model of earnings management,and examines the heterogeneity of earnings management behavior,motivation and economic consequences of different firms under the epidemic,and provides evidence for the information disclosure decisions of listed companies under the epidemic,as well as reference for future related research.Our study offers experience and a point of reference for the research on motivation of corporate earnings management and their effects in the impact of major public emergencies.It also provides policy recommendations for the supervision of corporate earnings management behavior and support for the development of economic entities.The epidemic has a long-term effect on all kinds of economic entities.The“flood China’s firms with liquidity”of economic assistance is inefficient.It is necessary to prevent opportunists from“fishing in troubled waters”.To ensure that the truly trapped enterprises,rather than“poor-mouth”enterprises,receive dividend bonus and to improve the efficiency of capital usage,it is essential to identify the real trapped entities,make the policy dividend focus on greater-impacted industries,micro,small and medium enterprises,and strengthen the targeted supply of funds.Due to data limitations,the research conclusion of this paper mainly elaborates the short-term earnings management strategy of Chinese enterprises when dealing with the impact of the epidemic.Future analysis can not only deeply explore the earnings management behavior of enterprises within the post-epidemic era supported the longer sample interval and annual report data,but also conjointly analyze the impact of the epidemic on the long-run performance and earnings management of enterprises from the logical perspective of globalization.In addition,future analysis will explore the dynamic performance of earnings management from the stage characteristics of epidemic development,specific manipulation methods,projects and alternative aspects,and reveal the psychological path and decision-making process of enterprise information disclosure in combination with text data.
作者
熊艳
盛清慧
Yan Xiong;Qinghui Sheng(School of Business,East China University of Science and Technology)
出处
《管理学季刊》
2023年第3期1-37,156-157,共39页
Quarterly Journal of Management
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“数字鸿沟视角下另类数据对企业信息披露的影响、路径及后果研究”(项目编号:22BGL076)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“重大突发卫生公共事件下的企业信息披露行为研究:基于风险感知的视角”(项目编号:21YJA630101)的资助
关键词
突发公共事件
负向盈余管理
同情红利
major public emergency
negative earnings management
sympathy bonus
作者简介
熊艳,华东理工大学商学院副教授,硕士生导师,2012年于厦门大学管理学院获得管理学博士学位,在《管理世界》《世界经济》《财贸经济》《财经研究》《经济管理》、Pacific-Basin Finance Journal等期刊发表过多篇论文。目前的研究兴趣为媒体治理、社交媒体与资本市场和信息披露等方面;通讯作者:盛清慧,E-mail:sqh0321sx@163.com,华东理工大学商学院硕士研究生。目前的研究兴趣为资本市场和公司治理等方面。
