摘要
数据访问限制行为可能会产生损害竞争的后果。数据垄断者可依靠海量数据改进产品和服务,一定程度上延续市场内部的维持性创新,但垄断者实施数据访问限制行为,则可能造成市场进入壁垒,阻碍来自市场外的颠覆性创新,损害竞争和消费者福利。应以市场的可竞争性为标准,以反垄断法中的“拒绝交易”条款下的“必需设施条款”为依据,遵循“相关市场界定—控制必需设施—拒绝交易—排除、限制竞争”的具体路径,对数据访问限制行为进行违法性认定。对数据访问限制行为的规制还需从主观方面进行考察,即实施数据访问限制行为的垄断者是否为了长期的排他性的利益(即抑制竞争)而牺牲了短期利润以及垄断者的商业理由是否足够有说服力。
Data access restrictions may have consequences that harm competition.Data monopolists can rely on massive amounts of data to improve their products and services,to some extent continuing the maintenance of innovation within the market.However,implementing data access restrictions by monopolists may create barriers to market entry,hinder disruptive innovation from outside the market,and harm competition and consumer welfare.The determination of the illegitimacy of data access restrictions should be based on competitiveness and the"necessary facilities clause"under the"transaction rejection"clause of the anti-monopoly law.The determination of illegitimacy of data access restrictions should follow the path of"relevant market definition-control of necessary facilities-transaction rejection-exclusion and restriction of competition".The regulation of data access restriction behavior also needs to be examined from a subjective perspective,namely whether the monopolist implementing data access restriction behavior sacrifices short-term profits for long-term exclusive benefits(i.e.suppressing competition),the competitive effect of prohibiting data access,and whether the monopolist's business reasons are sufficiently convincing.
作者
李晓珊
LI Xiaoshan(Regulation on Data Access Restriction Behavior under Anti-monopoly Law,Shanghai 201701,China)
出处
《法学论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第4期91-101,共11页
Legal Forum
基金
研究阐释党的二十大精神国家社科基金重大项目“加强重点领域、新兴领域、涉外领域立法研究”(23ZDA075)
上海政法学院校级科研项目“数字经济背景下数据抓取类竞争行为的法律问题研究”(2023XJ10)的阶段性成果
关键词
数据访问限制
拒绝交易
必需设施原则
垄断意图理论
结构主义
data access restrictions
refuse to deal
essential facilities doctrine
intent to monopolize test
structuralism theory
作者简介
李晓珊(1980-),女,山东临沂人,法学博士,上海政法学院上海司法研究所副教授,主要研究方向:商法、自贸区法、数据法。
