摘要
为何“放管服”改革中“红顶中介”屡禁不止?本文提出一个新的特许经营权的解释框架,认为“红顶中介”本质上是截留下放权力,获得特许授权并产生垄断性利润的经营商。根据收费方式和设立门槛,“红顶中介”可分为四种类型:代理人特许经营、庇护者特许经营、审批式特许经营和垄断性特许经营。随着市场化和法治化的推进,前三种类型已经逐步消失,但第四种垄断性特许经营却依然存在。虽然政府采取了改制脱钩和推动网上中介服务超市等措施,但是在垄断性特许经营模式中,“红顶中介”仍然通过发展二级加盟代理商的隐秘方式运营,凭借马太效应和杠杆效应而维持优势地位,同时借助隐性契约中的机会主义而逆向捆绑行政部门,最终因实质性垄断而催生隐藏定价和潜在寻租的可能。
Why haven't the Red-hat Intermediaries been forbidden completely during the reform of government functions?This paper puts forward a new explanation framework of franchising,and suggests that these intermediaries are essentially operators who intercept powers that should have been delegated,obtain franchises and produce monopoly profits.According to ways of charging and barriers to entry,the Red-hat Intermediaries can be divided into four types:agent franchise,shield franchise,approval franchise and monopoly franchise.The first three types have disappeared due to market reform and legalization,however,the fourth type,monopoly franchise,still exists.Although governments have taken measures such as restructuring and decoupling and promoting online intermediary service supermarkets,but in the monopoly franchise mode,Red-hat Intermediaries still operate in a secret way by developing secondary franchising agents and maintain their dominant position by the Matthew effect and leverage effect and bind administrative departments in reverse with the aid of opportunism in the implicit contract,which eventually results in substantial monopoly.Finally,hidden pricing and potential rent-seeking are possible.
出处
《中国公共政策评论》
2022年第1期187-199,共13页
Chinese Public Policy Review
关键词
放管服
“红顶中介”
行政审批
中介服务
特许经营
Reform of Government Functions
Red-hat Intermediaries
Administrative Approval
Intermediary Service
Franchising
作者简介
庄文嘉,中山大学中国公共管理研究中心、政治与公共事务管理学院副教授;通讯作者:余琴,华南师范大学政治与公共管理学院讲师;何伟强,共青团东莞市委员会办公室主任。
