摘要
建设职责明确、依法行政的政府治理体系是行政体制改革的重要目标。然而,基层政府部门存在众多职责越位的现象,如何理解这种政府行为?学界主要的解释是公共选择理论和制度视角,认为职责越位是部门追求利益最大化的结果,在一些宏观制度设计缺陷以及制度惯性下,更能诱导基层部门主动、自愿的职责越位。本文挑战了这一观点,认为基层部门职责越位更多是被动、非自愿的,且是多重制度间相互作用的系统结果。通过对市场监管领域的实地考察,表明基层市场监管部门职责越位多是被动和隐性的,是"耕了别人的地,荒了自己的田"。其背后的制度逻辑在于:首先,制度的属性变化,特别是监管职责属性、基层管理体制、部门性质的改变是职责被动越位的基础逻辑,深层逻辑指向权威体制与有效治理的关系;其次,职责被动越位的不同类型由不同的制度情景造就,"行政发包制"与压力加码制则提供了动力;最后,职责越位具有强化和扩张趋势,使职责越位逐渐常态化。本文的初步探索能完善政府职责越位的综合图景和中观层面的制度逻辑解释,为基层政府部门正确履职,职责正位提供一定的启示。
It is an essential goal for the administrative system reform to build a governing system with clear responsibilities and actions abiding by the law.However,there are numerous cases of offside responsibilities in the grassroots governmental departments.How to understand such governmental actions?The main explanation for it in the academic circle is the theory of public choice and the institutional perspective which consider the offside responsibilities the result of various departments pursuing the maximum interest.With the design defects of some macro-systems and the institutional inertia,the grassroots departments could be more induced to take offside responsibilities voluntarily and passionately.This paper thinks,however,that the offside responsibilities are more passively and involuntarily executed and come as the result of the interactions among multiple institutions,thus challenging the mainstream view.With the field observation of the market regulation area,the research in this paper shows that the offside responsibilities of the grassroots market regulation departments are mostly passive and recessive,that is,"tilling others’land while wasting one’s own".The critical institutional logic behind it points firstly,to the change of institutional attributes,especially that of the regulating responsibilities’attributes,the grassroots governing system and the departments’qualities which together form the basic logic of the passive execution of the offside responsibilities.The deeper logic,however,lies in the relationship between the authoritarian system and the effective governance.Secondly,various scenarios produce various types of the offside responsibilities and the systems of administrative subcontract and pressure going upwards in transmittal provide the drive.Ultimately,the offside responsibilities possess the tendency to be strengthened and expand which will gradually become the norm.The preliminary exploration of this study helps complete the comprehensive picture of the government offside responsibilities as well as offer some explanation with the institutional logic at the medium level.Hopefully it could provide some enlightenment for the grassroots governmental departments to perform their rightful duties.
作者
吴件
雷晓康
Wu Jian;Lei Xiaokang(School of Public Policy and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084,China;School of Public Management,Northwest University,Xi'an,710127,China)
出处
《公共管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第2期153-163,176,共12页
Journal of Public Management
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(18BFX048)
民政部政策研究中心项目(MCA20200556)
关键词
基层政府
职责越位
市场监管
制度逻辑
扩张
Grassroots Government
The Execution of Offside Responsibilities
Market Regulation
Institutional Logic
Expansion
作者简介
吴件(1993-),男,清华大学公共管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:市场监管、协同治理;通讯作者:雷晓康(1971-),男,毕业于西北大学,博士,西北大学公共管理学院教授、博士生导师,研究方向:基层治理、应急管理、社会保障,E-mail:x.k.lei@163.com。
