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容错纠错机制、高管短视倾向与国有企业创新 被引量:1

Fault Tolerance and Correction Mechanism, Short-Sighted Tendency of Executives and Innovation of State-Owned Enterprises
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摘要 本文基于2012~2021年中国A股上市公司数据,构建多期双重差分模型,考察了容错纠错机制的实施对国有企业创新的影响以及具体作用机制。研究发现,容错纠错机制的实施显著促进了国有企业创新;作用机制检验结果显示,容错纠错机制通过缓解高管短视倾向进而促进国有企业创新。异质性分析发现,容错纠错机制对国有企业的创新激励效应在投资不足、市场化水平低的企业中更显著。研究结论丰富了国有企业创新影响因素的研究文献,为理解容错纠错机制推进国有企业创新的实际问题提供了经验证据。 Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2021, this paper constructs A multi-period differential model to investigate the impact of the implementation of fault tolerance and error correction mechanism on the innovation of state-owned enterprises and its specific mechanism. It is found that the implementation of the fault tolerance and error correction mechanism significantly promotes the innovation of state-owned enterprises;the results of the mechanism test show that alleviating the short-sighted tendency of senior executives is the intermediary mechanism of the fault tolerance and error correction mechanism. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the innovation incentive effect of fault tolerance and error correction mechanism on state-owned enterprises is more significant in enterprises with insufficient in-vestment and low marketization level. The research conclusions enrich the research literature on the factors affecting the innovation of state-owned enterprises, and provide empirical evidence for understanding the practical problems of the fault tolerance and error correction mechanism to promote the innovation of state-owned enterprises.
出处 《运筹与模糊学》 2023年第6期7477-7492,共16页 Operations Research and Fuzziology
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