摘要
在我国对新能源汽车实施试点性补贴政策的背景下,本文借助一个信号传递博弈模型探究了政府与汽车企业补贴过程中存在的逆向选择问题,对其博弈均衡进行了分析。分析结果表明,新能源汽车发展水平的高低决定不同企业在获取补贴过程中采取的策略不一样,政府可以按如下方式动态调整补贴政策:在企业进行新能源汽车研发前期,对企业进行适当的补贴;在新能源汽车上市前,应注重新能源汽车基础设施的建立;在新能源汽车进入市场后,对购买新能源汽车者提供必要的支持,扩大新能源汽车使用的市场份额。
Under the background of our country of new energy vehicles pilot subsidy policy,in order to solve the problem in the process of government subsidies for auto enterprise the problems of adverse selection.A signaling game model is put forward in this paper,the game equilibrium is analyzed.It shows that different level of new energy vehicles development decision enterprise's strategy in the process of access to subsidies,the government can dynamic adjust subsidies as follows:it carry out research and development of new energy vehicles,for enterprises to carry out the appropriate subsidies at the early stage of the enterprises;it should pay attention to the establishment of the new energy vehicle infrastructure before the new energy vehicles listed.After the market entry of a new energy vehicles,car buyers to provide support for new energy resources,expand the market share of new energy vehicles.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第S1期817-822,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271164)
十堰市2015年软科学项目(15R33)
关键词
博弈论
新能源汽车
补贴
game theory
new energy vehicles
subsidy
