摘要
本文以机构投资者投资组合中不相关行业的极端收益率事件作为引发其关注程度变化的外生冲击,考察了机构投资者分心对管理层年报语调操纵行为的影响。本文发现,机构投资者分心会加大年报异常积极语调,而强化管理层语调操纵动机、弱化监督效应、损害信息环境是潜在的作用机制。进一步研究证实,异常积极语调是管理层趁机构投资者分心时操纵的结果。此外,本文还发现:机构投资者分心对年报异常积极语调的影响在向上操纵语调动机较强的公司中更显著;压力抵制型机构投资者的分心更可能加剧语调操纵;除年报外,管理层在机构投资者分心时也会提高业绩说明会上文本语调的异常乐观程度;而其他外部机制能发挥相应的替代作用,减弱机构投资者分心对异常积极语调的影响。
Prior research documents that managers possess strong incentives to engage in tone management to influence investors’perception of fundamental firm value,making the identification of determinants of tone management crucial for the accurate interpretation of corporate textual information.While existing studies have predominantly examined the impact of internal firm characteristics on tone management,scant attention has been paid to how institutional investors,as a critical external governance force,may affect such practices.As the only category of external investors capable of directly and effectively monitoring managerial behavior and improving corporate information environments,institutional investors may significantly influence managerial disclosure decisions.However,constrained by limited attention,institutional investors may become distracted and consequently reduce their attention to listed firms.How does the distraction of institutional investors affect managerial tone management?This paper utilizes extreme industry returns in an unrelated industry as an exogenous shock that shifts institutional investors’attention away from a firm,and investigates the impact of institutional investors’distraction on tone management of annual reports.Taking A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2020 as the research sample,this study finds that firms with distracted institutional investors engage more in tone management of the annual reports.After a series of robustness tests,the main results remain consistent.It’s found that increasing managers’incentives to manipulate tone,weakening supervision and governance mechanisms,and damaging the information environment are the potential channels through which institutional investors’distraction induces managers to inflate the tone.Further analyses show that the abnormal positive tone of the annual report can bring short-term positive market reaction,but has no predictive ability on the future long-term performance,implying that managers in firms with distracted institutional investors exploit tone strategically to misinform investors about the future fundamentals.In addition,the effect of institutional investors’distraction on tone management is more pronounced in firms whose executives have a strong incentive to manage investors’perceptions upward.The distraction of pressure-resistant institutional investors is more likely to lead to tone management.There is no significant difference in the level of tone management between the section of management discussion and analysis(MD&A)and other parts of the annual report.And institutional investors’distraction also has a positive effect on tone management of earnings communication conference.Besides,the study shows that other external mechanisms,such as analysts and the media,can weaken the impact of institutional investors’distraction on tone management,implying they can play a corresponding substitute role when the institutional investors are distracted.The potential contributions of this study are reflected in the following aspects:First,it provides a valuable addition to the literature on the determinants of textual disclosure tone.Unlike prior studies that examine the antecedents of tone management from internal firm factors,this paper focuses on an external factor with significant influence on corporate decision-making:institutional investors.From a behavioral finance perspective,we investigate how institutional investors’limited attention affects managerial tone management in annual reports.Second,this study enriches the literature on the economic consequences of institutional investors’distraction.Existing research primarily examines how distracted institutional investors enable opportunistic behaviors in firms’quantitative disclosures.In contrast,this paper shifts the focus to textual disclosures,exploring how institutional investors’distraction influences tone management in annual reports and its underlying mechanisms.This expands the scope of research on how limited attention among institutional investors shapes corporate behavior and deepens the theoretical understanding of their governance role.Third,this study partially addresses endogeneity concerns in causal inference regarding the association between institutional investors and corporate information disclosure.By employing an exogenous proxy for shifts in institutional investors’attention,this paper mitigates endogeneity issues and demonstrates that institutional investors’attention affects disclosure quality.These findings advance limited attention theory and provide large-sample micro-level evidence from China’s institutional context,supporting academic theories on institutional investors’governance effects.The practical implications of this paper are as follows:First,institutional investors should optimize the allocation of their limited attention across investment portfolios by leveraging their professional expertise to engage in corporate governance through multiple channels,thereby mitigating managerial opportunistic behavior.Second,listed companies should strengthen the monitoring mechanisms and improve information environments to curb potential tone management.Third,regulatory authorities should refine disclosure rules for narrative reporting in annual reports and improve the institutional environment to facilitate institutional investors’active participation in corporate governance.
作者
袁玉
吴战篪
廖佳
Yuan Yu;Wu Zhanchi;Liao Jia(Business School,Huaqiao University;School of Management,Jinan University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
北大核心
2025年第8期123-134,共12页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72173057、72211530057)
福建省社会科学基金项目(FJ2024MGCA018)资助。
关键词
机构投资者
有限关注
语调操纵
监督治理
信息环境
Institutional Investors
Limited Attention
Tone Management
Monitoring and Governance
Information Environment
作者简介
袁玉,华侨大学工商管理学院讲师、博士,研究方向为公司财务与公司治理;通讯作者:吴战篪,暨南大学管理学院教授、博士,研究方向为公司财务与社会责任;廖佳,华侨大学工商管理学院副教授、博士,研究方向为公司金融与公司治理。
