摘要
在节能减排的背景下,考虑政府对制造商低碳减排和回收再制造的双重补贴政策以及供应链成员的互惠偏好行为对供应链运营的影响,将产品的低碳商誉水平作为状态变量,构建了集中式决策模型、分散式决策模型和引入互惠偏好的分散式决策模型,分析了供应链成员的互惠偏好行为对供应链成员最优决策、产品的低碳商誉水平、供应链成员利润、供应链总利润以及政府双重补贴的影响.研究表明:1)政府对制造商的双重补贴和企业之间的互惠偏好行为均能有效激励企业为节能减排做出更多的努力.2)供应链成员之间的互惠偏好程度的增加会提高产品的低碳商誉水平,从而提高消费者对产品的信任度.3)随着供应链成员之间互惠偏好程度的增加,供应链各成员的利润以及供应链的总利润均呈现上涨的趋势,且进一步研究对比了供应链成员被动接受与主动实施互惠偏好行为对自身利润和供应链总利润的影响,结果表明,相比于被动接受博弈方的互惠偏好行为,制造商和零售商主动实施互惠偏好行为更能有效促进自身利润的增加,其次,零售商主动对制造商实施互惠偏好行为比被动接受制造商的互惠偏好行为更利于供应链总利润的增加.4)供应链成员的互惠偏好行为会替代一部分政府对制造商双重补贴的作用,有效地节约了政府的财政支出.
Under the contxet of energy conservation and emission reduction,considering the influence of the government's double subsidy policy for manufacturers' low-carbon emission reduction and recycling as well as remanufacturing and the reciprocal preference behavior of supply chain members on the optimal decision-making and dynamic coordination of the supply chain,a centralized decision-making model,a decentralized decision-making model and a decentralized decision-making model with reciprocal preference were constructed by taking the low carbon reputation level of the product as a state variable.This paper analyzed the effects of reciprocal preferences of supply chain members on the optimal decision-making of the supply chain,the low-carbon reputation level of the products,the profits of supply chain members and the total profits of the supply chain as well as the double subsidies of the government.The results of the study show that:1)Both government double subsidies to manufacturers and reciprocal preference behaviors among enterprises can effectively motivate enterprises to make more efforts for energy saving and emission reduction.2)The increase of reciprocal preference among supply chain members will increase the level of low-carbon reputation of the products,which will increase the trust of consumers to the products.3)With the increase of reciprocity preference among members of the supply chain,the profits of each member of the supply chain and the total profits of the supply chain show an upward trend.Moreover,this paper further studies and compares the effects of supply chain members'passive acceptance and active implementation of reciprocal preference behavior on their own profits and the total profit of the supply chain.The results show that,compared with the passive acceptance of the game party's reciprocal preference behavior,the active implementation of reciprocal preference behavior by manufacturers and retailers is more effective in promoting their own profits.Secondly,retailers' active implementation of reciprocal preference behavior towards manufacturers contributes more to the increase of total supply chain profits than passive acceptance of manufacturers' reciprocal preference behavior.4)Reciprocal preference behavior of supply chain members replaces part of the role of the government's double subsidies to manufacturers and effectively saves the government's financial expenditures.
作者
李小燕
杨丽芳
陈双双
LI Xiao-yan;YANG Li-fang;CHEN Shuang-shuang(School of Information,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2025年第7期11-31,共21页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
北京市社会科学基金(21JJC025)。
关键词
互惠偏好
低碳商誉
微分博弈
动态优化
政府补贴
reciprocal preference
low-carbon reputation
differential game
dynamic optimization
government subsidy
作者简介
通信作者:杨丽芳。
