摘要
以我国沪、深两市2007—2022年国有控股公司为研究对象,研究了政府放权如何影响国有企业购买董事高管责任保险,以及上述影响在不同情境下的差异。结果表明:政府放权减少了政府保护,提高了国有企业市场化经营和风险承担水平,进而激发国有企业购买董事高管责任保险。政府放权对国有企业购买董事高管责任保险的激励效应受到行业竞争程度和社会信任氛围的制约,行业竞争程度增强了政府放权对国有企业购买董事高管责任保险的促进效应,而社会信任减弱了政府放权对国有企业购买董事高管责任保险的促进效应。此外,本研究还发现,政府放权促进了国有企业风险承担和创新,进而促进国有企业购买董事高管责任保险,企业风险承担和创新是政府放权影响国有企业购买董事高管责任保险决策的重要中介机制。本文将政府放权引入至企业购买董事高管责任保险决策的研究中,丰富和拓展了企业购买董事高管责任保险决策影响因素和政府放权经济后果的研究,为深刻认识我国企业购买董事高管责任保险积极性不高的现实状况提供了一个全新解释。
Based on a sample of Chinese state-owned companies from 2007 to 2022,this paper studies the effect of government decen-tralization on directors'and officers'liability insurance purchase decision in state-owned enterprises and the moderating effect of industry competition and social trust.The results show:government decentralization reduces government protection,promotes market-oriented operation and risk-taking in state-owned enterprises,and in turn motivates state-owned enterprises to purchase D&O insurance.The incentive effect is restricted by industry competition and social trust atmosphere.Industry competition enhances the promotion effect,while social trust negatively moderates the relationship.In addition,this study also finds that government decentralization promotes risk taking and innovation,thereby promoting the purchase decision of D&O insurance.This paper introduces government decentralization into the study of the purchase decision of D&O insurance,enriches and expands the research on the affecting factors of the purchase decision of D&O insurance and the economic consequences of government decentralization,and provides a new explanation for the reality of the low use of D&O insurance in China's transitional economy.
作者
苏坤
范亦璇
Su Kun;Fan Yixuan(School of Management,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi'an 710072)
出处
《管理评论》
北大核心
2025年第6期3-14,共12页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72172127)
西北工业大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(D5000230054)。
作者简介
苏坤,西北工业大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;范亦璇,西北工业大学管理学院博士研究生。
