摘要
党组织参与公司治理,是我国公司治理结构中的一个重要特征。文章利用我国A股非金融类上市公司2009-2016年的数据,考察了党组织通过"双向进入、交叉任职"参与治理对公司避税行为的影响。研究发现,"双向进入"对税收激进度几乎没有显著影响,而"交叉任职"公司的税收激进度显著更低。进一步研究发现,"交叉任职"对避税活动的抑制作用主要存在于税收激进度较高、相关风险较高的情况下,而"交叉任职"在税收激进度较低的情况下并不会显著抑制企业正常的避税行为;在国有企业和非国有企业中,"交叉任职"对税收激进度的影响在统计上并没有显著差异;"全面从严治党"前后,"交叉任职"的作用也没有显著差异。文章从企业避税行为的角度提供了党组织参与治理经济后果的经验证据。
The participation of Communist Party of China(thereafter CPC)in corporate governance is an important feature of corporate governance structure in China.CPC organizations play a political core or political leading role in both state-owned and non-state-owned companies.The institution"two-way entry and cross-appointment"combines CPC organizations with governance mechanisms such as the board of directors and the board of supervisors organically and enables CPC organizations to play significant roles in companies’major production and operation activities.Tax avoidance not only means that more wealth can be left in companies,but also relates higher legal/regulatory risks,reputational risks,agency problems(especially"rent diversion")and increased opacity.As an important strategic activity of a company,tax avoidance is inevitably affected by corporate governance.Although there is plenty of literature about the relationship between corporate governance and tax avoidance,it is not clear whether CPC’s participation in corporate governance through"two-way entry and cross-appointment"has a significant impact on tax avoidance activities.Using the data of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2009 to 2016,this paper examines the impact of CPC’s participation in corporate governance through"two-way entry and cross-appointment"on corporate tax avoidance.The results show that"two-way entry"has little impact on tax aggressiveness,while"cross-appointment"has a significantly negative effect on tax aggressiveness.Further tests show that"crossrepresentation"can decrease the likelihood that the degree of tax aggressiveness is extremely high,but it could not lead to extremely low tax aggressiveness.The results also show that"cross-appointment"can decrease tax aggressiveness significantly when it is at a high level,while the effect is not significant when it is at a low level.In summary,CPS’s participation in corporate governance has a negative effect on tax aggressiveness only when tax aggressiveness is at a high level.In addition,there is no significant difference in the impact of"cross-appointment"between state-owned and non-state-owned companies,although the authors only find weak evidence to support the negative effect of"cross-appointment"on tax avoidance in non-state-owned companies.There is no significant difference in the effect of"cross-appointment"on tax avoidance before and after 2013 either.This paper makes three contributions to the literature:First,it provides empirical evidence on the economic consequences of CPC’s participation in governance from the perspective of corporate tax avoidance behaviors.It is helpful to understand the role of CPC’s participation in governance in suppressing corporate misconduct and promoting better fulfillment of corporate tax obligations.Second,it explores and finds the asymmetric effect of CPC’s participation in governance on tax avoidance.It implies that the participation of CPC in governance will not prevent companies from normal and low risk-related tax avoidance activities.Such results extend the research of Armstrong,et al.(2015)and Li,et al.(2016),and help to evaluate the consequences of party organizations’participation in governance more comprehensively and objectively.Third,it enriches the literature on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and tax avoidance activities from the perspective of political governance.
作者
李明辉
刘笑霞
程海艳
Li Minghui;Liu Xiaoxia;Cheng Haiyan(Business School,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China;School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing 210094,China)
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期49-64,共16页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602047)
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2017ZDIXM069).
关键词
政治治理
避税行为
公司治理
交叉任职
political governance
tax avoidance
corporate governance
cross-appointment
作者简介
李明辉(1974-),男,江苏金坛人,南京大学商学院教授,博士生导师;刘笑霞(1979-),女,山西阳泉人,南京理工大学经济管理学院教授;程海艳(1988-),女,贵州长顺人,南京大学商学院博士研究生。
