摘要
为促进黄河流域生态保护PPP项目参与主体间的稳定合作,保障流域生态保护PPP项目运行的有效性,文章借助有限理性演化博弈模型探究在第三方监管部门(非政府组织)约束下,私人主体与政府部门合作的复制动态及演化稳定策略,进一步分析实现演化策略稳定性的关键条件。结果表明,第三方监管部门约束下,该演化博弈的稳定性与私人主体获取的长期收益和短期收益密切相关,实现最优稳定策略的关键在于第三方监管部门对违约一方的惩罚额度要高于政府部门履约给予私人主体的财政支持;政府部门履约时,私人主体采取“正向行为”策略所获取的收益要高于采取“机会主义”策略时所获取的收益。基于演化博弈结果,提出提升项目整体收益率以保障私人主体收益、加快出台黄河流域生态保护PPP项目规范文件、完善黄河流域生态保护PPP项目参与主体间的风险共担机制,以期增强PPP项目在黄河流域生态保护领域中应用的可持续性。
In order to promote stable cooperation among the participating parties of the ecological protection PPP project in the Yel⁃low River Basin and ensure the effectiveness of the operation of the PPP project,this article uses a bounded rationality evolutionary game model to explore the replication dynamics and evolutionary stability strategies of cooperation between private entities and gov⁃ernment departments under the constraints of third-party regulatory departments(non-governmental organizations),and further an⁃alyzes the key conditions for achieving the stability of evolutionary strategies.The results indicate that under the constraint of thirdparty regulatory authorities,the stability of this evolutionary game is closely related to the long-term and short-term benefits ob⁃tained by private parties.The key to achieving the optimal stability lies in that the penalty amount imposed by the third-party regu⁃latory authorities on the defaulting party is higher than the financial support provided by government to private parties in fulfilling their obligations;meanwhile,when the government fulfills its obligations,the private party can obtain more benefits by adopting the"positive behavior"strategy than by adopting the"opportunistic"one.Based on the results of evolutionary game theory,it is pro⁃posed to improve the overall project return rate to ensure the benefits of private entities,accelerate the introduction of PPP project specifications for ecological protection in the Yellow River Basin,and improve the risk sharing mechanism among participating par⁃ties in PPP projects for ecological protection in the Yellow River Basin,in order to enhance the sustainability of PPP projects in the field of ecological protection in the Yellow River Basin.
作者
赵晶晶
葛颜祥
许梦醒
Zhao Jingjing;Ge Yanxiang;Xu Mengxing(School of Urban Governance and Public Affairs,Suzhou City University,Suzhou 215104,China;School of Economics and Management,Shandong Agricultural University,Tai’an 271018,China)
出处
《新疆农垦经济》
2025年第5期56-63,共8页
Xinjiang State Farms Economy
基金
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目(项目编号:2024SJYB1080)
苏州城市学院国家级预研课题(项目编号:2023SGY003)。
作者简介
赵晶晶(1993-),女,山东博兴人,博士,讲师,研究方向:农业资源与环境管理;葛颜祥(1965-),男,山东莒南人,博士,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:农业资源与环境管理;许梦醒(1995-),女,安徽宿州人,博士,讲师,研究方向:环境治理、社区治理。
