摘要
本文手工提取2003—2022年财政部会计信息质量随机检查公告披露出的问题企业数据,实证分析了政府会计监督对上市公司商业信用融资的影响。结果发现:(1)会计信息质量随机检查公告提高了问题企业的商业信用融资水平;(2)会计信息透明度、公司治理水平、企业积极整改的监督治理效应,和融资约束、融资成本的替代性融资效应是二者的重要机制;(3)二者的促进作用在国有企业、内控质量低、现金流波动性强、供应链效率低、分析师关注度低和要素市场发育程度低的组别中更强,且被公告企业的商业信用融资行为倾向于“不利他仅利己”。本文证明了财政部会计信息质量随机检查的积极意义。
Using a hand-collected sample of problematic firms discovered in the random inspection of accounting information quality conducted by the Ministry of Finance of China(MOF),this paper examines the impact on commercial credit of governmental oversight on public firms’accounting practices.We find that:(1)the random inspection improves the focal firm’s commercial credit financing;(2)the abovementioned improvement in commercial credit is facilitated by the governance effect of transparent accounting information,corporate governance,and proactive corporate rectification,along with the role of alternative finance in relieving financing constraints and financing costs;(3)the improvement in commercial credit brought by the random inspection is more pronounced in state-owned companies;firms with inferior internal control quality,higher cash flow volatility,lower supply chain efficiency,less analyst coverage,and located in areas with underdeveloped factor markets;and firms whose financing behaviors are regarded as“self-serving and detrimental to others”.Our findings provide evidence on the positive impact of the random inspection of accounting information quality conducted by the MOF.
作者
武剑锋
程韵萦
李赛楠
Wu Jianfeng;Cheng Yunying;Li Sainan(Business School,Beijing International Studies University,Beijing,China 100024;Beijing Customs District P.R.China,Beijing,China 100026)
出处
《当代会计评论》
2024年第2期53-73,共21页
Contemporary Accounting Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“数字经济下区域科技园区协同创新环链布局与运行机制研究”(23BGL310)的资助
关键词
政府会计监督
商业信用融资
替代性融资
监督治理
governmental oversight on accounting practices
commercial credit financing
alternative finance
oversight and governance
作者简介
通讯作者:武剑锋,副教授,E-mail:1265102758@qq.com;程韵萦,硕士研究生,E-mail:1328953320@qq.com;李赛楠,硕士研究生,E-mail:lisainan1999@qq.com。
