金融监管、影子银行与企业短贷长投——来自资管新规的经验证据

Financial Regulation, Shadow Banking, and Corporate Long-Term Investment with Short-Term Financing: Empirical Evidence from the New Regulations on Asset Management

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摘要党的二十大报告提出“强化金融稳定保障体系,依法将各类金融活动全部纳入监管,守住不发生系统性风险底线”。短贷长投是中国及发展中国家企业普遍存在的投融资期限错配问题,是导致系统性风险的重要因素。文章以资管新规为准自然实验,检验了金融强监管对企业短贷长投的影响。研究发现,资管新规实施后,影子银行融资依赖程度高的企业短贷长投度显著降低。这一效应在企业、行业和区域层面具有显著差异,而这一效应是通过压缩企业短期负债和拓展长期融资实现的。进一步研究发现,资管新规通过抑制企业短贷长投行为降低了企业的经营风险和破产风险。这一研究结果表明,金融强监管能够降低企业的投融资期限错配,有助于守住“不发生系统性风险底线”。文章在前期文献关于企业短贷长投治理的“金融发展观”基础上,首次提出“金融监管观”,拓展和深化了这一领域的研究,也为政府决策提供了理论和经验证据。 The 2Oth National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasized the importance of"strengthening the financial stability safeguard system,bringing all types of financial activities under regulation by law,and guarding against systemic risks.Long-term investment with short-term financing(LTISF)is a prevalent issue of financing term mismatch among enterprises in China and other developing countries,posing a significant systemic risk.Using the new asset management regulation as a quasi-natural experiment,this paper examines the impact of strong financial regulation on LTISF among enterprises.The findings show that after the implementation of the regulation,enterprises highly dependent on shadow banking financing significantly reduced their LTISF practices.This effect varies notably across enterprise,industry,and regional levels and is achieved through the reduction of short-term debt and an expansion in long-term financing.Further analysis reveals that the regulation mitigates both operational and bankruptcy risks by curbing LTISF behaviors.These results indicate that strong financial regulation effectively addresses the maturity mismatch in enterprise financing,helping to maintain the"no systemic risk"baseline.Building on prior literature that emphasizes a"financial development perspective"in tackling LTISF issues,this study introduces the"financial regulation perspective,"broadening and deepening research in this field while offering theoretical and empirical evidence to inform policymaking.

作者李增福李林郭美婷 Li Zengfu;Li Lin;Guo Meiting(School of Economics and Management,South China Normal University,Guangzhou;School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan;School of Law,Tsinghua University,Beijing)

机构地区华南师范大学经济与管理学院武汉大学经济与管理学院清华大学法学院

出处《经济社会体制比较》 CSSCI 北大核心 2024年第6期85-97,共13页 Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基金国家社会科学基金“混合所有制企业中非控股股东利益侵占行为及治理研究”(项目编号:19BGL057)。

关键词金融监管短贷长投影子银行资管新规 Financial Regulation Long-Term Investment with Short-Term Financing Shadow Banking New Regulations on Asset Management

分类号 F832.1 [经济管理—金融学]

作者简介李增福,华南师范大学经济与管理学院教授、博士生导师;李林,武汉大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生;郭美婷,清华大学法学院硕士研究生。