摘要
地方政府债务是中国经济发展中的重要课题,也是亟待解决的难题,是中国金融体系系统性风险的重要因素。本文从案例出发,提出测算地方政府债务的新方法,解决现有方法测不全、测不准的问题。本文发现,2020年我国地方政府债务总额约为85.49万亿元,约占GDP的比重为84.3%。地方政府债务中基建债务为61.69万亿元,其中地方政府通过地方城投公司举借的基建债务约为46.37万亿元,占全国地方国企总负债的42.6%。从全国整体层面看,地方债务已超地方政府自身财力,地方政府的财政收入和地方国企的经营收入在扣除必要支出后已经无法支付地方债务利息,更无力还本,迫切需要中央政府进行干预。本文理论分析表明,地方债高企的本质原因是地方政府过于追求GDP且对地方经济长远发展的重视不足,其后果是债务难以偿还,削弱了地方政府融资能力可能导致未来投资不足。本文实证分析表明,高企的地方政府债务拖累了投资增长,对经济增长有负面影响。因此,必须设计一套整体解决方案,化解地方政府债务问题。
Local government debt is a significant issue in China's economic development and poses an urgent challenge,as it is a main source of systemic risk in the financial system.However,existing literature has yet to establish definite findings or consensus on the scale,causes,and impact of local government debt,which need further study.This paper aims to address these gaps by examining the scale,causes,and consequences of local government debt in China,with a focus on the following three core questions:First,what is the scale and structure of local government debt in China?By examining cases from municipalities,this paper analyzes infrastructure project funding structures,identifies local infrastructure investment and financing patterns,and develops a method to estimate debt levels in local infrastructure investments.This approach considers the newly added debt,debt repayment,and the practice of refinancing old debt through new loans,providing a comprehensive view of debt accumulation.In addition to the stock of infrastructure debt in each province over the years,this paper measures debts related to shantytown renovation,the land purchase reserve system,and the fields of science,education,culture,and health to capture the full scale of local government debt.The findings indicate that in 2020,total local government debt in China was about 85.49 trillion yuan,or about 84.3%of GDP.Of this,about 61.69 trillion yuan was infrastructure debt,with city investment companies borrowing 46.37 trillion yuan,or about 42.6%of the total liabilities of local State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs).This high debt level far exceeds the solvency of local governments and local sOEs,as their available financial resources cannot cover the interest payments,let alone the principal.Without effective intervention of the central government,sustaining this debt would bedifficult.Second,why is local government debt so high and what are its essential and institutional causes?Based on the basic principles of government and economics,this paper constructs a game theory model from the perspective of the incentive and behavior of local governments.The findings suggest that when local governments are overly focused on GDP growth while putting insufficient value on the future,they tend to raise excessive debt in the present,which will undermine their capacity to repay debt and weaken their ability to finance future investments,ultimately leading to underinvestment.Third,what is the impact of high local government debt on local economic development??Existing literature offers mixed and inconclusive evidence on this issue.This paper conducts an empirical analysis using provincial-level data on local government debt as measured and calculated in the study,leading to more direct and comprehensive findings.The results reveal that local government debt inhibits economic growth,as high debt levels act as a drag on investment,leading to a decline in the growth rate of infrastructure and manufacturing investment.Therefore,addressing the problem of local government debt requires a comprehensive set of solutions.
作者
李稻葵
张鹤
LI Daokui;ZHANG He(Tsinghua University,100084;CITIC Group Corporation,100020)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第12期5-21,共17页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
“开启第二个百年新征程”重大研究专项(18VBN001)。
关键词
地方政府债务
宏观杠杆率
基础设施投资
政府与市场经济学
Local Government Debt
Macro Leverage Ratio
Infrastructure Investment
Government and Market Economics
作者简介
李稻葵,清华大学中国经济思想与实践研究院院长、教授,100084;通讯作者:张鹤,中信集团战略与投资管理部主管、博士,100020。电子邮箱:weszhang617@163.com。
