摘要
第三方市场合作是“一带一路”高质量建设的重要方向和创新路径,而融资问题决定着合作参与方分工组合的形式,是探讨第三方市场合作开展的关键问题。为此,本文以中国企业、发达国家企业和第三方市场国家企业为主体,基于投资要素组合理论构建三方演化博弈模型,探究影响第三方市场融资合作模式选择的关键因素,剖析主体间的利益关系,进而讨论三方博弈主体在合作不同阶段的融资博弈行为和策略选择。研究发现:在初期合作阶段,融资合作模式选择为“两方承建,一方出资”,产能激励偏好和风险厌恶特性凸显;在稳定合作阶段,融资模式选择为“一方出资,一方承建,一方协助”,且受到技术溢出激励和一方积极策略下风险分配系数的影响;在战略合作阶段,融资合作模式达成“共同出资,共同承建”的理想状态,但仍受到积极策略下磋商成本和信息不对称的负向影响。最后,从项目投融资的角度,针对第三方市场合作的不同阶段对政府及企业提出建议。
Taking Chinese enterprises,enterprises in developed countries and enterprises in the third market countries as the main body,a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed based on the portfolio theory of investment factors,and four third-party market financing cooperation modes divided by the strategic alliance theory correspond to eight strategies of the game model,describing the third-party market cooperation body and financing cooperation mode.The key factors are explored that affect the choice of the third-party market cooperation mode,the interest relationship between the subjects is analyzed,and then the financing game behavior and strategy choice of the third-party game subjects in different stages of cooperation are discussed.Finally,a numerical example is simulated.It is found that:(1)In the initial stage of cooperation,the financing cooperation mode is chosen as two parties undertake construction and one party contributes,the participation of Chinese enterprises and enterprises in developed countries is low,and the capacity incentive,the advantages and disadvantages of the host state-owned business environment and the risk allocation mechanism are the key factors affecting the game results in this stage;(2)In the stable cooperation stage,the financing mode is selected as one party invests,one party undertakes construction,and one party assists.The incentive of knowledge and technology spillover from developed country enterprises to Chinese enterprises and the negotiation cost of active participation of developed country enterprises under the low strength guidance strategy of Chinese enterprises are the key factors affecting the game results in this stage;(3)In the stage of strategic cooperation,the financing cooperation mode has reached the ideal state of joint investment and joint construction,but it is still negatively affected by the negotiation cost and information asymmetry risk under the active strategy,especially the enterprises in the third-party market countries are more sensitive to cost and information.The model reference and stable strategies for third-party market cooperation at different stages are provided.At the same time,it provides a practical paradigm for the government and enterprises to participate in third-party market cooperation,and also provides countermeasures and suggestions for building high-quality the Belt and Road and improving the third-party market financing cooperation mechanism.Third-party market cooperation conforms to the trend of globalization and meets the common demands of the development of all countries.However,the unprecedented changes in the past century have had a great impact on the world economy.The threshold of enterprise cross-border project financing risk premium has been raised,external financing costs have increased,and the lack of common information between entities has become increasingly serious,which further aggravates the risk aversion perception of cross-border investment by various enterprise entities.Third-party market cooperation entities have low willingness to invest and finance,and the problem of weak participation is gradually highlighted.The financing problem determines the form of division and combination of cooperation participants,and is the key issue to explore the third-party market cooperation.
作者
刘钻扩
李宇
李守伟
邸凯旋
刘长玉
刘荣坤
Liu Zuankuo;Li Yu;Li Shouwei;Di Kaixuan;Liu Changyu;Liu Rongkun(School of Business,Shandong Normal University,Jinan 250358,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第8期36-49,共14页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(20BJL058)。
关键词
“一带一路”
第三方市场
合作策略
融资模式
演化博弈
the Belt and Road
third party market
cooperation strategy
financing mode
evolutionary game
作者简介
通讯作者:刘钻扩(1975-),男(汉族),山东菏泽人,山东师范大学商学院,教授,博士生导师,博士,研究方向:产业组织与管理控制,E-mail:lzk50888@hotmail.com.
