摘要
在由一个供应商和两个制造商组成的供应链中,基于提高产品质量的研发动机,借助博弈论模型分析了溢出效应下企业在合作研发情形和非合作研发情形下的最优决策问题。研究表明:供应商在供应链的研发活动中存在“敲竹杠”的投机行为,其提价幅度受到市场竞争程度和研发溢出效应的综合影响。同时通过分析发现,与非合作研发情形相比,只有当溢出效应超过某一特定值时,企业之间的研发合作才能够提高研发水平,增加产量和供应商的利润;而无论溢出效应取何值,合作研发对于制造商来说总是有利的。
In this paper,we studied a supply chain composing of one supplier and two manufacturers with R&D motivation to improve product quality.With the help of the game theory model,we analyzed the optimal decision-making of the enterprises in cooperative R&D and non-cooperative R&D situations respectively under the spillover effect.The result showed that the supplier would speculate to exploit the R&D activities of the supply chain,and the extent of its price raise was affected jointly by market competition and R&D spillover effect.At the same time,through the analysis,we found that,compared to non-cooperative R&D,only with the spillover effect over a certain value,could R&D cooperation among the enterprises increase the level of R&D,leading to higher output and supplier profits;while regardless of the spillover effect,cooperative R&D was always beneficial to the manufacturers.
作者
谢萌
李玉凤
XIE Meng;LI Yufeng(School of Management,Hainan University,Haikou 570100,China)
出处
《物流技术》
2021年第4期46-51,共6页
Logistics Technology
基金
海南省自然科学基金高层次人才项目(2019RC143)
国家自然科学基金项目(71640025)。
关键词
技术溢出
竞争
制造商
合作研发
非合作研发
供应链
technology spillover
competition
manufacturer
cooperative R&D
non-cooperative R&D
supply chain
作者简介
谢萌(1996-),女,山东莒县人,硕士,主要研究方向:物流与供应链管理;李玉凤(1974-),女,安徽孟城人,博士,教授,主要研究方向:物流与供应链管理。
