摘要
新就业形态下劳动者的工伤保险参保覆盖对于新就业形态的健康发展至关重要。以职业伤害风险较高且从属性偏弱的众包骑手群体为对象,从工伤保险覆盖的供需主体利益均衡视角,构建即时配送平台、众包骑手与政府的三方演化博弈模型,探究众包骑手工伤保险不完全覆盖困境生成的内在机理,推进众包骑手形成参保覆盖的具体措施。利用MATLAB仿真验证博弈分析的相关结果。研究发现:骑手遭受职业伤害的概率会影响骑手对商业保险经济补偿与平台对骑手赔偿的期望收益判断,从而影响骑手的参保策略选择;骑手参保下的订单量与单价下降损失高于商业保险资金成本,商业保险经济补偿低于平台对骑手赔偿是造成骑手工伤保险不完全覆盖困境的直接原因;政府是推动骑手工伤保险参保覆盖的关键主体,通过降低骑手参保下的损失与平台工伤保险缴纳费率,提高对平台“漏保”行为的处罚与平台对骑手赔偿等措施,能够加快推进骑手工伤保险的参保覆盖。
Promoting work-related injury insurance coverage for newly employed workers is very important for the healthy development of new employment forms.This paper takes the group of crowdsourcing riders,who are at a higher risk of occupational injuries and weaker attributes,as an example.From the perspective of balancing the interests of supply and demand parties involved in work-relat-ed injury insurance coverage,a tripartite evolutionary game model involving instant delivery platforms,crowdsourcing riders,and the government is constructed.This model aims to explore the internal mechanisms behind the dilemma of incomplete insurance coverage for crowdsourcing riders,as well as specific measures to promote the formation of insurance coverage among these riders.The results of game analysis are verified by MATLAB simulation.The research finds that the probability of riders suffering occupational injuries influ-ences their assessment of the expected returns from commercial insurance economic compensation and platform compensation,thereby affecting their choice of insurance participation strategies.The primary reasons for the incomplete coverage of work-related injury insur-ance among riders are that the loss of order volume and order price for insured riders exceeds the financial cost of commercial insur-ance,and the economic compensation from commercial insurance is lower than the compensation provided by the platform.The govern-ment plays a key role in promoting work-related injury insurance coverage for riders.By reducing the loss incurred by insured riders and the work-related injury insurance payment rate on the platform,and by increasing penalties for platforms that fail to provide insur-ance as well as enhancing compensation for riders,the government can accelerate the formation of insurance coverage for riders.
作者
肖亮
李宏勇
XIAO Liang;LI Hongyong(Modern Business Research Center,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Business Administration,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China)
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第5期19-32,共14页
Economy and Management
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(19BGL098)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(22JJD630019、22JJD790082)
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(23YJCZH095)。
关键词
新就业形态
工伤保险
众包骑手
演化博弈
数值仿真
new employment forms
work-related injury insurance
crowdsourcing rider
evolutionary game
numerical simulation
作者简介
肖亮(1976-),男,江西吉安人,浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心、管理工程与电子商务学院教授,博士生导师,博士,研究方向为物流与供应链管理;李宏勇(1997-),男,安徽六安人,浙江工商大学工商管理学院博士研究生,研究方向为平台治理与博弈优化。
