摘要
美德伦理与规则伦理的争论焦点之一在于对可法典化的不同态度。规则伦理认为道德行动需要一套明确规则的指导,这些规则等同于一种决策程序,而美德伦理学缺乏此类规则,所以有着“不可法典化(uncodifiability)”的缺陷。与之相对,美德伦理学者认为不可法典化不仅不是缺陷,反而正是美德伦理学的长处。美德伦理分别从实践推理、规则运用、实践审思三个不同层次上对可法典化进行了批判。这些批评在相当程度上指出了规则伦理学的某些误区。但一些美德伦理学者试图在此基础上更进一步,在批评现代道德哲学进路之余全面否定道德哲学中规则的作用,却使得可法典化批判走向了误区。理解可法典化批判的关键在于跳出目前流行的把普遍规则与具体情境截然对立起来的简单二分法,认识道德规则的限度与必要。
One of the focal points of the debate between virtue ethics and rule ethics is the different attitudes toward codifiability.Rule ethics argues that moral action requires a clear set of rules that amount to a decision-making process,and that virtue ethics lacks such rules and is therefore“uncodifiable”.In contrast,virtue ethicists argue that non-codifiability is not a defect,but rather a strength of virtue ethics.Virtue ethics critiques codifiability at three different levels:practical reasoning,rule application,and practical deliberation.To a considerable extent,these critiques point out some of the misconceptions of rule ethics.However,some virtue ethicists try to go furtherthan this and reject the role of rules in moral philosophy comprehensively.It makes the codifiability critique go to the wrong place.The key to understanding the codification critique is to go beyond the current popular dichotomy of universal rules in stark opposition to specific contexts and to recognize the limits and necessity of moral rules.
出处
《哲学分析》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期106-116,197,198,共13页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
国家社科后期项目“当代能力理论研究”(项目编号:20FZXB052)阶段性成果。
作者简介
马庆,上海社会科学院哲学研究所副研究员;刘科,上海理工大学马克思主义学院教授。
