摘要
本文以我国2009~2020年A股上市公司为样本,研究CEO与CFO任期次序对会计信息可比性的影响。结果表明:CEO任期次序前于CFO会显著降低会计信息可比性。进一步研究发现,当CEO为非两职合一、非企业创始人、无财务背景、任职来源于企业内部以及CFO为董事会成员时,CEO更可能通过任期次序这一机制影响CFO的财务决策,从而降低会计信息可比性。此外,外部治理机制方面,较高的审计质量、稳定型机构投资者持股以及媒体较高关注度能够有效地抑制CEO通过任期次序影响CFO财务决策的行为;内部治理机制方面,良好的内部控制和独立董事持股能够显著抑制CEO通过任期次序影响CFO财务决策的行为。本文的研究结果不仅丰富了会计信息可比性影响因素的文献,也对CEO与CFO选聘时间等人力资源管理问题具有一定启示。
Using Chinese A-share listed enterprises from 2009 to 2020 as a sample,this paper studies the impact of CEO tenure order prior to CFO on the comparability of accounting information.The result shows that CEO tenure order before CFO significantly reduces the comparability of accounting information.Furthermore,the results show that when CEO is not duality,not the founder of the enterprise,has no financial background or holds the post from within the enterprise,and CFO is a member of the board of directors,CEO is more likely to influence CFO's financial decisions through the tenure order mechanism,thus reducing the comparability of accounting information.In addition,in terms of external governance mechanism,higher quality audit,the shareholding of stable institution investors and higher media attention can effectively curb the opportunistic behavior of CEO.In terms of internal governance mechanism,better internal control and independent director shareholding can significantly inhibit the impact of CEO on financial decision-making behavior of CFO through the tenure order mechanism.The research results of this paper not only enrich the literature on the internal influencing factors of the comparability of accounting information,but also have an enlightenment significance for human resource management issues such as the appointment time of CEO and CFO.
作者
周冬华
杨柳
ZHOU Dong-hua;YANG Liu
出处
《财务研究》
CSSCI
2023年第1期58-70,共13页
Finance Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972091)。
关键词
CEO
CFO
任期次序
会计信息可比性
CEO
CFO
tenure order
the comparability of accounting information
作者简介
周冬华,江西财经大学会计学院教授,博士生导师;杨柳,江西财经大学会计学院硕士研究生。
