摘要
通过构建理论模型讨论数字平台纵向部分交叉所有权并购对竞争的影响。对比数字平台纵向持股前后的市场均衡结果发现,上游数字平台持有下游数字平台部分所有权后,持股比例越高,对竞争的损害越大。数字平台有动机通过不涉及控制权变更的部分所有权并购规避反垄断执法。通过对腾讯收购虎牙和斗鱼部分所有权的案例研究发现,此案例在纵向部分交叉所有权并购阶段即已损害了市场竞争。据此提出国家市场监督管理总局应对虎牙和斗鱼并购案向前追溯、否决腾讯对虎牙和斗鱼的部分所有权并购,并加强针对部分所有权并购的反垄断立法和执法等建议。
In the last few years,mergers and acquisitions(M&As)of partial cross ownership have gradually become a common form of concentration of undertakings,and they are widely present in the internet industry.Against this background,issues such as the impact of partial cross ownership M&As in digital platforms on competition,and whether the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies should pursue antitrust enforcement against partial cross ownership M&As in digital platforms,are worthy of in-depth exploration.However,few studies investigate from the perspective of partial cross ownership M&As in digital platforms,especially from the perspective of vertical partial cross ownership M&As in digital platforms.Considering the exclusive dealing of upstream digital platforms and the exclusive dealing of downstream digital platforms,we construct a game theory model of upstream and downstream digital platforms to analyze the impact of M&As of vertical partial cross ownership of digital platforms on the competition by comparing the market equilibrium before and after the vertical shareholding of digital platforms.It is found that after the vertical partial ownership M&As of upstream digital platforms by downstream ones,the profits of digital platforms with partial cross ownership relationships between the upstream and downstream platforms have increased,and the profits of digital platforms without partial cross ownership relationships have decreased.The higher the shareholding ratio of the upstream digital platforms in the downstream digital platforms,the greater the damage to the market competition.In addition,digital platforms have incentives to evade antitrust enforcement through partial ownership M&As that do not involve changes in control.We conduct a typical case study on Tencent’s acquisition of partial ownership of Huya and Douyu,and find that Tencent,Huya and Douyu were suspected of excluding and restricting competition through exclusive dealing and monopolistic agreements during the stage of vertical partial cross ownership M&As.Compared with existing literature,this paper has achieved some new progress.First,we make an analysis on the economic effect of vertical partial cross ownership M&As on two-sided markets based on the study of vertical partial cross ownership M&As in one-sided markets,the study of vertical M&As in two-sided markets and the study of horizontal partial cross ownership M&As in two-sided markets.Second,different from existing studies focusing on network externality and the charging mode of digital platforms,this paper starts from the perspective of the behavior of platform operators,and finds that the exclusive dealing on upstream digital platforms and downstream digital platforms is the crucial factor in the impact of vertical partial cross ownership M&As.Third,this paper provides policy implications for anti-monopoly legislation and law enforcement of partial cross ownership M&As,to prevent operators from avoiding anti-monopoly review through partial cross ownership M&As,or even involving in collusion or abuse of dominant market position.The research results gained in this paper provide important implications for China to strengthen anti-monopoly enforcement.First,partial ownership M&As,especially partial ownership M&As which are not involved in the change of control,should be incorporated in the Anti-monopoly Law,the Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings,and the Measures on Review of Concentrations of Undertakings.Second,the State Administration for Market Regulation should trace back to similar mergers such as the merger events of Huya and Douyu,and reject partial ownership M&As that have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.Third,anti-monopoly enforcement should be strengthened on partial ownership M&As of operators including digital platforms,and anti-monopoly investigations on abuse of dominant market positions such as exclusive dealing and platform blocking through partial ownership M&As should be conducted by the State Administration for Market Regulation.
作者
于左
王昊哲
陈听月
YU Zuo;WANG Haozhe;CHEN Tingyue(Center for Industrial and Business Organization,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期1-16,共16页
Modern Economic Science
关键词
数字平台
部分交叉所有权
前向持股
竞争损害
反垄断
digital platform
vertical partial cross ownership
forward shareholding
competitive harm
antitrust
作者简介
于左,男,东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心研究员,博士生导师,研究方向为产业组织理论与竞争政策;通信作者:王昊哲,男,东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心博士研究生,研究方向为数字平台竞争政策,电子邮箱为478473997@qq.com;陈听月,女,东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心硕士研究生,研究方向为数字平台竞争政策。
