摘要
为了确定教育培训行业整顿中参与者的最优策略,运用演化博弈理论,建立了地方政府,教育培训机构(以下简称教培)互惠博弈模型.分析了均衡策略和非均衡策略条件下参与者的策略选择概率.根据模拟结果,可以通过设定参数的数值,使政府更倾向于增加对教培机构的监管,教培机构选择合法经营以增加收入.
In order to determine the optimal strategies of participants in the reorganization of the education and training industry,the evolutionary game theory was used to establish the reciprocal game model of local governments and education and training Institutions.The strategy selection probability of participants under the conditions of equilibrium strategy and non-equilibrium strategy is analyzed.According to the simulation results,the value of the parameter can be set to make the government more inclined to increase the supervision of education and training institutions,and the education and training institutions choose to operate legally to increase their income.
作者
邢志言
杨彦龙
XING Zhi-yan;YANG Yan-long(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
2022年第10期86-93,共8页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(71961003)
关键词
演化博弈
双减政策
教育培训机构
演化稳定策略
evolutionary game
double reduction policy
education and training institutions
evolutionary stability strategy
作者简介
通信作者:杨彦龙。
