摘要
通过Stackelberg博弈模型探讨在无制造商投入CSR、单一制造商投入CSR和制造商均投入CSR这3种情形下的定价策略以及供应链成员风险偏好程度、竞争市场需求波动程度对均衡价格策略的影响,最后结合数值分析进行验证与补充。研究表明:零售商风险规避使得产品的批发价格升高,零售价格降低;制造商风险规避使得产品的批发价格与零售价格俱降低;不同CSR投入情况下,当产品批发价格随着市场波动有相同的变化趋势时,需要实现的先决条件不同;当制造商承担CSR时,会提供给零售商较低的批发价格合约,这导致更低的零售价格提供给市场,进而增加消费者福利。
Through Stackelberg game model,this paper studies the influence of pricing strategy,risk preference of supply chain members,and fluctuation of competitive market demand on equilibrium price strategy under the three conditions of no corporate social responsibility investment,corporate social responsibility investment by single manufacturer and corporate social responsibility investment by all manufacturers;finally,numerical analysis was conducted for verification and supplementing.The research shows that retailers risk aversion leads to higher wholesale price and lower retail price.Manufacturers risk aversion reduces both wholesale and retail prices of products.In the case of different corporate social responsibility investments,when the wholesale price of products has the same change trend with market fluctuations,different prerequisites need to be realized.When manufacturers undertake corporate social responsibility,they will provide retailers with lower wholesale price contracts to lower the retail price of products in the market and increase consumer welfare.
作者
王永明
杨悦
尹红丽
WANG Yongming;YANG Yue;YIN Hongli(School of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science&Technology,Kunming 650093,China;School of Information Science and Technology,Yunnan Normal University,Kunming 650500,China)
出处
《科技与经济》
2022年第5期101-105,共5页
Science & Technology and Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目——“基于演化博弈论融合方法的中国—东盟跨国农产品供应链网络优化设计与风险控制研究”(项目编号:71640028
项目负责人:尹红丽)成果之一。
作者简介
王永明,昆明理工大学管理与经济学院教授、博士生导师,研究方向:系统仿真与优化、物流与供应链管理;杨悦,昆明理工大学管理与经济学院硕士研究生,研究方向:供应链管理;尹红丽,云南师范大学信息学院副教授、硕士生导师,研究方向:供应链管理。
