摘要
为厘清政府再制造补贴对再制品质量的复杂作用,利用博弈论研究了政府再制造补贴下独立再制造商的市场进入策略以及原制造商予以应对的质量决策问题。在消费者选择决策分析的基础上,建立并求解了原制造商和独立再制造商的数量博弈及质量决策模型。研究发现,政府再制造补贴系数的增大将使市场依次经历原制造商完全垄断、再制造威胁、竞争3种状态。威胁状态下的再制造补贴有助于提升新产品质量和价格,降低新产品数量;竞争模式会导致新产品质量和价格同时下降,但有利于提高再制品需求和独立再制造商利润,增加消费者剩余。只有当政府再制造补贴处于较高水平时,独立再制造商进入市场才会有利于社会福利的增长,而政府的再制造补贴政策是否真正能降低环境影响,取决于单位再制品和单位新产品的碳排放量比值。
To clarify the complex role of government subsidies for remanufacturing on the quality of remanufactured products,the game theory was used to study the market entry strategy of Independent Remanufacturer(IR)and the quality decision-making issues of Original Equipment Manufacturer(OEM)under government remanufacturing subsidies.Based on the analysis of consumers choice decision,the quantitative game and quality decision models of OEM and IR were established and solved.Research showed that the market would experience three states that were complete OEM monopoly,remanufacturing threat and competition in turn with the increase of government remanufacturing subsidy coefficient.Under the remanufacturing threat condition,remanufacturing subsidies could help improve the quality and price of new products and reduce the quantity of new products.Under the competitive model,the quality and price of new products would decrease at the same time,but the demand for remanufactured products and IR s profits would improve for increasing consumer surplus.Only when government remanufacturing subsidies were at a relatively high level,IR s entry into the market would benefit the growth of social welfare.While,whether the remanufacturing subsidy policy could really reduce the environmental impact or not depended on the ratio of carbon emission amount of per unit of remanufactured product to the amount of per unit new product.
作者
高鹏
杜建国
陆玉梅
朱宾欣
GAO Peng;DU Jianguo;LU Yumei;ZHU Binxin(School of Business,Jiangsu University of Technology,Changzhou 213001,China;School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
出处
《计算机集成制造系统》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第8期2426-2436,共11页
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金
江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(20GLD007)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672153)
江苏理工学院社科基金资助项目(KYY20511)。
关键词
再制造
政府补贴
市场进入策略
产品质量决策
remanufacturing
government subsidy
market strategy
product quality decision
作者简介
高鹏(1978-),男,江苏常州人,江苏理工学院商学院副教授,江苏大学管理学院博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理,E-mail:gaopeng@jsut.edu.cn;杜建国(1970-),男,四川合江人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:管理系统与社会管理工程;陆玉梅(1972-),女,吉林蛟河人,教授,博士,研究方向:民营企业管理、区域经济管理;朱宾欣(1990-),女,江苏溧水人,博士研究生,研究方向:物流与供应链管理、创新管理。
