摘要
腐败在本质上是作为公共代理人的公权力承担者与经济行为主体之间的利益交换行为,是经济和市场原则在政治领域的错用,是公权力异化和被滥用的结果。从制度经济学视角分析,市场失灵会导致权力获得对稀缺资源的分配权,民众与政府官员之间的多重委托代理关系会导致公权力委托代理关系的复杂化,从而造成权利与权力的关系失衡,进而引发权力委托代理关系失灵。当制度缺失、监管缺位时,腐败收益往往会高于腐败成本,政府官员在对成本收益进行考量后,就会实施腐败行为。而预防和治理腐败,不仅需要不断推进市场化改革,改善公共权力委托代理关系,还需要提高腐败行为的机会成本。
Corruption is essentially a profit exchange between public power holders as public agents and economic actors,a misuse of economic and market principles in the political arena,also the result of the alienation and abuse of public power.From the perspective of institutional economics,market failures can result in power gaining the advantage to allocate scarce resources,and multiple principal-agent relationships between the public and government officials can complicate the principal-agent relationship,resulting in an imbalance between right and power,failure of the principal-agent relationship inevitable.In case of the absence of governing systems and supervision regulations,government officials,after weighing the cost-benefit ratio,will surely corrupt.To prevent and control corruption,it is necessary not only to promote market-oriented reforms to improve the principal-agent relationship regarding public power,but also to increase the opportunity cost of corruption.
作者
肖克
张龙辉
XIAO Ke;ZHANG Longhui(School of Politics and Law,Northeast Normal University,Chuangchun 130117,Jilin,China)
出处
《廉政文化研究》
2021年第4期8-18,共11页
Anti-corruption and Integrity Culture Studies
基金
国家社会科学基金年度项目(20BZZ096)
吉林省社会科学基金项目(青少年研究专项)(2020Q2)
中央高校科研业务费专项资金资助项目(14QT001)。
关键词
制度经济学
腐败治理
市场失灵
委托代理
成本收益
institutional economics
corruption treatment
market failure
agency by agreement
cost-benefit ratio
作者简介
肖克(1978-),男,吉林吉林人,东北师范大学政法学院副教授,博士生导师;张龙辉(1987-),男,河南开封人,东北师范大学政法学院博士研究生。
