摘要
能否通过对CEO合理授权,提高企业投资效率呢?本文融合管家理论和代理理论,选取2007-2017年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,考察了CEO自由裁量权与企业投资效率的关系。研究发现:(1)在一定界限内,CEO自由裁量权能够提高企业投资效率,但超过一定界限,CEO自由裁量权则会损害企业投资效率,即两者呈倒"U"型作用关系。(2)在过度投资的企业中,CEO自由裁量权对企业投资效率有显著的正向影响,而在投资不足的企业中,随着CEO自由裁量权的增加,企业投资效率呈现出先提高、后降低的特点。本文认为在我国特殊情境下,提高企业投资效率的关键在于授予CEO足够的自由裁量权而非过度限制CEO自由裁量权的行使,研究结果为如何合理授予CEO自由裁量权来提高企业投资效率提供了一定启示,也为政府根据企业实际情况制定合理的改革政策提供借鉴。
Can we improve the enterprise investment efficiency by reasonably authorizing CEO discretion?Based on the agency theory and the stewardship theory,this paper has selected 2007-2017 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the sample,and investigates the relationship between CEO discretion and enterprise investment efficiency.The research finds that:(1)Within certain limits,CEO discretion can improve the enterprise investment efficiency,but beyond a certain limit,CEO discretion can damage the enterprise investment efficiency,namely there is a inverse u-shaped relationship of CEO discretion to enterprise investment efficiency.(2)In the over-Investment enterprise,CEO discretion has significant positive influence on corporate investment efficiency,and in the under-Investment enterprise,with the increase of CEO discretion,enterprise investment efficiency shows improving then reducing characteristics.This paper argues that under the special situation in our country,the key to improve the enterprise investment efficiency is giving CEO enough discretion,not restricting CEO.The results of the study help on providing some enlightenment for how to reasonably grant the CEO discretion to improve the enterprise investment efficiency,also is helpful for the government to formulate reasonable supply-side reform policies according to the actual situation of enterprise.
作者
陈志斌
汪官镇
Chen Zhibin;Wang Guanzhen
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第12期85-98,共14页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“政府规制、产品市场竞争网络与企业财务风险衍化的交互作用机制研究”(71872040)的阶段性成果。
