摘要
文章选取2012—2018年中国714家创业板上市公司年度数据,对于内部控制与董事联结对企业创新的影响及其作用机制进行了实证分析。研究表明:(1)内部控制水平的提高会促进企业创新,但董事联结程度的提高会抑制企业创新。相比高董事联结度企业,低董事联结度企业提升内部控制质量对企业创新的助推力度更大。相比低内部控制质量企业,高内部控制质量企业增加董事联结度对企业创新的抑制力度更大。(2)研发人力资本在内部控制与企业创新关系中承担着中介作用,提升内部控制水平会加大研发人力资本配置力度,由此促进企业创新。融资约束在董事联结与企业创新关系中承担着中介作用,提高董事联结程度会加大融资约束,从而抑制企业创新。(3)两职合一会加剧企业代理问题,由此减弱内部控制对企业创新的促进作用,但会缓解董事联结对企业创新的抑制作用。(4)进一步研究发现,提升研发投入资本化率是企业形成持续创新动力的重要渠道。为提升创新绩效,发明型与实用型创新企业更倾向于加大长期持续的研发投入,外观型创新企业更倾向于加大当期的研发投入。相比国有企业,非国有企业的内部控制与董事联结对企业创新的影响力度更大。该研究成果将为企业提高治理水平和创新质量提供重要的理论指导与决策参考。
The paper selects annual data of 714 listed companies on GEM in China from 2012 to 2018,and makes an empirical analysis of the influence of internal control and board interlock on enterprise innovation and its function mechanism.The study shows,firstly,the improvement of internal control will promote the enterprise innovation,but the increase in the degree of board interlock will inhibit enterprise innovation.Compared with enterprises with a high degree of board interlock,the improvement of the quality of internal control in enterprises with a low degree of board interlock has a greater boost to enterprise innovation.Compared with enterprises with low internal control quality,the increase of board interlock in enterprises with high internal control quality inhibit enterprise innovation more.Secondly,R&D human capital plays an intermediary role in the relationship between internal control and enterprise innovation.Improving the internal control increases the allocation of R&D human capital,thereby promoting the enterprise innovation.Financing constraints play an intermediary role in the relationship between board interlock and enterprise innovation.Increasing the degree of board interlock increases financing constraints,thereby inhibiting enterprise innovation.Thirdly,CEO duality aggravates the agency problem of enterprises,thereby weakening the influence of internal control on enterprise innovation,but it alleviates the inhibitory effect of board interlock on enterprise innovation.Fourthly,a further study shows that increasing the capitalization rate of R&D investment is an important channel for enterprises to form continuous innovation motivation.In order to improve the innovation performance,invention and utility-type innovative enterprises are more inclined to increase long-term continuous R&D investment,while,appearance-oriented innovative companies are more inclined to increase current R&D investment.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the internal control and board interlock of non-state-owned enterprises exerts a greater influence on enterprise innovation.The research provides important theoretical guidance and decision-making reference for enterprises to improve governance and innovation quality.
作者
顾海峰
卞雨晨
GU Haifeng;BIAN Yuchen(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051)
出处
《管理学刊》
CSSCI
2020年第6期48-60,共13页
Journal of Management
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(13BGL041)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(20YJA790014)。
关键词
内部控制
董事联结
企业创新
两职合一
Internal Control
Board Interlock
Enterprise Innovation
CEO Duality
作者简介
顾海峰(1972-),男,江苏苏州人,博士,东华大学旭日工商管理学院教授、博士生导师,研究方向:公司金融与公司治理等;卞雨晨(1996-),男,江苏徐州人,东华大学旭日工商管理学院硕士研究生。
