摘要
货币政策与宏观审慎政策的国际协调是构建更加开放、团结、普惠性全球经济金融系统的客观要求。本文创新性地突破独立分析边界,综合研究双支柱调控框架下两类政策的溢出效应及传导渠道。通过构建完全信息静态博弈模型以及对比亚洲金融风暴、广场协议、后次贷危机时期国际协调的历史案例,本文论证只有对称性国际协调才能够实现帕累托最优。基于此,本文探讨人民币国际化背景下我国参与货币政策与宏观审慎政策国际协调的难点与对策。
The international coordination of monetary policy and macro-prudential policy is an objective requirement to build a more open, united and inclusive global economic and financial system. Innovatively breaking through the boundaries of the existing literature which analyses the two policies respectively, the paper for the first time systematically studies the policy spillover effects and its transmission channels under the double-pillar regulatory framework. By constructing the complete information static game model between two countries and comparing the historical cases of international coordination of monetary policy and macroprudential policy in the Asian financial turmoil, Plaza Agreement and the post-subprime crisis period, the paper demonstrates that only symmetrical international coordination can achieve Pareto optimality. Accordingly, the paper also discusses the difficulties and countermeasures of China’s participation in the international coordination of monetary policy and macro-prudential policy with the background of RMB internationalization.
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第8期87-98,共12页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
国家社科基金“‘一带一路’建设”重大研究专项项目(项目编号:18VDL012)。
关键词
双支柱调控框架
货币政策
宏观审慎政策
国际协调
Double-pillar Regulatory Framework
Monetary Policy
Macro-prudential Policy
International Coordination
作者简介
严佳佳:福州大学经济与管理学院、福建省金融科技创新重点实验室(福州大学),副教授;许莉莉:福州大学经济与管理学院研究生。
