摘要
目前我国新能源分时租赁汽车正处于发展初期,其发展过程中存在的问题接踵而至,如运营不力、安全隐患以及骗取补贴金等,对消费者和政府造成了较大的困扰.本文运用演化博弈理论构建了政府部门、企业与消费者之间的三方动态博弈模型,基于复制动态方程和雅可比矩阵对模型进行求解分析,并通过Python软件对模型结果进行数值仿真模拟.研究表明,当关键参数取值位于不同数值区间时,系统分别呈现出四种演化稳定结果.适当加大补贴额度与惩罚力度、增加消费者得到的补偿系数比例、敦促企业降低努力经营成本,有利于新能源分时租赁汽车行业的健康发展.研究结论为政府部门政策制定及决策实施提供理论依据与参考.
Presently,new energy time-sharing rental vehicles are in an early stage of development in China,and problems like ineffective operation,security issues and subsidies cheating arise one after another,which have caused great trouble to consumers and the government.In this paper,a three-way dynamic game model among government,enterprises and consumers is constructed and solved based on the evolutionary game theory.The model results are numerically simulated by Python software.Theresearch shows that there are four evolutionary stability results when the key parameters are set in different numerical ranges.Therefore,appropriately increas-ing the amount of subsidy and punishment,increasing the proportion of compensation coefficient received by consumers,and urging enterprises to reduce operating costs are conducive to the healthy development of the new energy vehicle rental market.The conclusions of the research can work as a theoretical basis and reference for government sectors to make and implement a policy.
作者
万晓榆
陈业建
WAN Xiao-yu;CHEN Ye-jian(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Chongqing 400065,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第2期79-87,共9页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(15XGL024)
重庆市人文社会科学重点研究项目(K2018-22)。
关键词
新能源
分时租赁
演化博弈
监管
new energy
time-sharing
evolutionary game
supervision
作者简介
万晓榆(1963-),男,江苏南京人,教授,博士,研究方向:消费者行为、共享经济;陈业建(1995-),男,安徽六安人,硕士研究生,研究方向:信息经济学。
